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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the state of maritime operations in the Asia-Pacific region 
conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) since Beijing’s admission to the 
United Nations in 1971.  The goal is to develop a historical understanding of Chinese 
militarized incidents at sea and assess the ability of current Chinese maritime agreements 
and international institutions to reduce such incidents in the future.  The data compiled in 
this paper can help facilitate future United States and PRC maritime agreements and, 
more generally, cooperation.  Understanding the current nature of Chinese engagement 
can help to recalibrate our measurement standards along with our goals for future talks. 
To foster successful maritime cooperation between the United States and China 
adherence to several principles will greatly increase the chances of that relationship’s 
success: building on common interests, utilization of confidence building measures 
(CBMs), basing cooperation on domestic (i.e., national) laws, building mechanisms for 
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This thesis examines the state of maritime operations in the Asia-Pacific region 
conducted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)1 since Beijing’s admission to the 
United Nations in 1971.  The goal is to develop a historical understanding of Chinese 
militarized incidents at sea and assess the ability of current Chinese maritime agreements 
and international institutions to reduce such incidents in the future. 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question to what extent can existing 
international legal agreements reduce the risks of a Chinese “naval incident” and mitigate 
the causes of future conflict?  First, in what areas can there be an expectation of potential 
conflict between a rising China and predominate U.S. maritime presence?  Second, to 
what extent can existing international institutions reduce risks of an incident and provide 
reassurances to all involved parties?  Finally, what specific issues should future 
agreements seek to address in order to both reinforce key elements already in existence 
and fill potential holes in policy? 
In order to properly facilitate a complete analysis of Chinese maritime agreements 
Chapter I of this thesis constructs a framework from which to begin the examination.  
First, the recent historical context that China has experienced since the early 1970s are 
summarized.  Second, Chapter I turns to the potential sources and methodology to be 
used to facilitate this study, more generally.  Third, a sketch of the arguments made 
throughout the paper are outlined to facilitate understanding of each segment’s 
contribution to the overall thesis.  Fourth, the last portion of this chapter clearly defines 
the point of departure for the individual and overall arguments made for the whole of the 
thesis. 
 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of this paper the term “China” will be used to refer to the PRC.  The author 
recognizes the real world situation surrounding the People’s Republic of China and Republic of China and 
the use of the term “China” in this paper is in no way an assertion on either side of the dispute, rather, this 
term is used for clarity of argument. 
 2
A. A MARITIME CHINA 
The PRC is on a meteoric rise in both wealth and power.  The combination of the 
sheer number of people, over 1.3 billion people in 2004, and the country’s rapid 
economic growth- ranked fifth in the 2007 world rankings with a 9.1 percent average 
annual increase in real GDP2- portends increasing demand for raw materials and energy, 
competition for world markets, and attempts to gain influence on the world stage.3  The 
PRC’s economic growth is due in part to the country’s efforts at globalization and 
burgeoning integration into the world markets; markets that are foreign, disparate, and 
overseas (see Chart 1, an example of China’s overseas shipping routes in the case of 
petroleum).  China’s globalization and increasing demand for energy points toward a 
Figure 1.   Chinese sea-lane for oil tankers4 
                                                 
2 Andrea Burgess et al. Pocket World in Figures: 2007 Edition, London, The Economist & Profile 
Books Ltd., 2007: 32, 50-7. 
3 Barry Naughton. The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth, Cambridge: MIT Press, 2007: 3. 
4 Tatsu Kambara and Christopher Howe. China and the Global Energy Crisis: Development and 
Prospects for China’s Oil and Natural Gas, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2007: 124. From Figure 7.2, note: 
Oil tankers are classified as follows: 50,000-100,000 tons, ordinary tankers for ocean voyage; 200,000-
300,000 tons, Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC); 400,000-500,000 tons, Ultra Large Crude Carrier 
(ULCC). 
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future where, “given the Chinese government’s inability to manage crises effectively and 
China’s increasingly aggressive behavior, maritime incidents are potentially the most 
volatile issue in U.S.-China relations.”5 
While China’s effort to expand its influence will be felt throughout the world, the 
most pronounced ramifications of the PRC’s expanding prominence will be felt in the 
Asia-Pacific region.  Moreover, shipping will become, if it has not already, a vital aspect 
of the PRC’s national interest and, by extension, their national security.  Since 2000, 
China has experienced over 5 percent growth in maritime transport every year and finally 
broke into double-digit growth in 2005 with a 10.3 percent growth rate.6  The importance 
of the maritime aspect of the Chinese economy is a result of the legitimacy that the 
Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) regime ties to the PRC’s continued economic 
development.7  It would seem only logical then, that the PRC would look to maintain a 
sphere of influence within the Pacific Ocean in order to ensure the unhindered 
continuation of those interests.  These sentiments are clearly espoused in the publication 
China Military Science where the Chinese argue that the new mechanism for power will 
be international institutions, that the maritime realm will hold great influence on 
international relations, that the Asia-Pacific will emerge as the central playing field in the 
maritime realm, and that due to these factors continued development of Chinese maritime 
capabilities and capacity is a vital national interest.8 
The confluence of a 21.7 percent increase in maritime transport within the Asia-
Pacific region and the progress of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) towards a 
21st century “Blue Water” Navy portends a China that will begin to compete for maritime 
influence with the United States, the current guarantor of security and stability on the 
                                                 
5 John J. Tkacik, Jr.  “Needed: A Realistic Look at China Policy,” Executive Memorandum, The 
Heritage Foundation, no. 907, December 2, 2003: 2. 
6 UNCTAD Secretariat.  Review of Maritime Transport, 2006, New York and Geneva, 2006: 8-10. 
7 Bernard D. Cole. The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century, Annapolis: 
Naval Institute Press, 2001: 3. 
8 Yan Youqiang and Chen Rongxing. “On Maritime Strategy and the Marine Environment,” Zhongguo 
Junshi Kexue [China Military Science], Vol 2, Beijing, May 20, 1997: 81-92. Translation from 
http://www.Opensource.gov, accessed: March 18, 2008, document: FTS19971010001256. 
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high seas.9  How this competition plays out, whether in a peaceful, civil manner or in a 
more hostile fashion, will be greatly influenced by how the maritime realm is governed.  
The particulars of the maritime agreements and international institutions that China takes 
part in will directly impact the daily interaction within the Asia-Pacific region.  While 
maritime agreements are not a panacea, they can militate against conflict within the 
broader Asia-Pacific by removing some of the potential flashpoints through prior 
negotiations. 
There is a need to examine the extent to which the international law is applicable 
to current issues.  Specific “maritime agreements” should be part of other, broader 
international laws that can help China’s increased interaction with the rest of the world 
continue peacefully.  The issues that need to be addressed include misunderstandings that 
can escalate tensions, navigational, and specified use (fishing and mineral) rights and 
privileges.10  Additionally, territorial disputes and maritime disorder (piracy and criminal 
activities) could all lead to conflict if there is not sufficient capacity and capability within 
the international institutions intended to govern. 
B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Maritime law is not a recent development; rather, it has been constantly evolving 
over the years that man has been on the high seas.11  However, there is a very recent 
addition to long standing precedents that is affecting the high seas, the UN’s Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), passed in 1982 and finally brought into effect in 1994. 
 
 
                                                 
9 UNCTAD Secretariat.  Review of Maritime Transport, 2006, New York and Geneva, 2006: 8-10.  
For a discussion on China’s prospects for a “Blue Water Navy,” see also: Cole. The Great Wall at Sea. 
10 For a discussion on the importance of international legal agreements see generally: Mark J. 
Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,” Ocean 
Development & International Law, Vol 31, 2000: 229 (223-247). 
11 For a starting point on maritime law see Hugo Grotius’ late 16th century The Free Sea; Hugo 
Grotius. The Free Sea, 1578-1645, ed. David Armitage, trans. Richard Hakluyt, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty 
Fund, 2004.   Also, UNCLOS available: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm. Accessed: 
November 7, 2007. 
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With the passage of UNCLOS taking up the majority of the scholarly focus over the past 
decade, a broader, big-picture view of the current state of maritime law in the Pacific 
Ocean is lacking. 
One of the few authors who endeavor to examine many of the broader issues at 
play within the East Asia-Pacific region is Mark J. Valencia.  Despite being one of the 
most prolific authors on all subjects surrounding Asian maritime issues, he does not 
address historical precedent from maritime incidents as it applies to the broader treaties, 
agreements, and protocols that govern current maritime operations within the Asia-
Pacific region.  In fact, Valencia points out some requirements for future research while 
writing in Marine Policy 29, specifically, “fact-finding regarding previous incidents; … 
the means and manner of enforcement of any agreed rules; and suggestions for policy.”12 
In looking at the current body of international legal agreements that are applicable 
to the maritime realm in the Asia-Pacific, the UNCLOS is by far the most applicable 
treaty but definitely not the only one.  The next significant example would be the Military 
Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), which recognizes “the need to promote 
common understanding regarding activities undertaken by their respective maritime and 
air forces.”13  Additionally, there are several agreements that have a less ambitious scope 
and instead was focused on nuanced areas of maritime operations such as the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR).  Finally, there is the 
need to consider the extra- and intra-regional conferences that attempt to develop 
initiatives regarding various maritime facets.  Some examples of these groups include the 
Council for Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia (CSCAP) and the Western Pacific 
Naval Symposium (WPNS). 
There are a myriad of sources for a broader perspective on the Asia-Pacific region 
as it pertains to China, most of these attempting to answer the question, “will China 
                                                 
12 Mark J. Valencia and Kazumine Akimoto. “Report of the Tokyo meeting and progress to date,” 
Marine Policy, Vol. 29, Elsevier, 2005: 101-106. 
13 “Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry 
of National Defense of the People's Republic of China on Establishing a Consultation Mechanism to 
Strengthen Military Maritime Safety,” Department of Defense, available: 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/milmarag.htm, accessed: August 27, 2007. 
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become a stabilizing or destabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific region” rather than looking 
at the particular maritime aspect of this stability.14  While there has been an increase in 
focus on maritime issues with the implementation of the UNCLOS, overall there is a lack 
of total coverage integrating all manner of maritime agreements.  Combining several 
authors’ coverage of varying historical events will help provide the proper context to 
examine the current state of maritime law.  On the other hand, there have been several 
examinations of the broader international institutions impact on naval and maritime 
issues.  Examples of these larger institutions include the U.N., ASEAN, CSCAP, and the 
myriad military-to-military programs that China is starting to participate in.15 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter I of this thesis provides the basic framework for further examination of 
the issues regarding Chinese involvement with maritime agreements.  As outlined in the 
beginning of the chapter, this portion of the thesis focuses on background information, 
sources, methodology, organization, and, most importantly, definitions of terms and the 
problem, more generally.  In the chapters that follow this thesis examines the 
fundamental issues surrounding Chinese involvement with inter alia maritime agreements 
as traced out below. 
In Chapter II, a look at what international institutions prior abilities have been is 
needed.  First, what international legal agreements are relevant to the maritime realm and 
specifically in regards to the Chinese situation?  Establishing the relevance will bound the 
range of problems that we can reasonably expect to be dealt with by those treaties.  
Additionally, how well do the relevant treaties cope with those problems and do those 
abilities have any caveats or limited applicability, such as with potential military rivals or 
sea lines of communication (SLOCs)?  Further, China’s potential rise to maritime 
                                                 
14 Rex Li. “China and Asia-Pacific Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” Security Dialogue, 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sage Publications, 1995.  See also: Mark J. Valencia. A 
Maritime Regime for North-East Asia, Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1996. 
15 For a discussion on the broader international institutions and their impact on naval and maritime 
issues see: for Strategic issues, Bruce Vaughn, “U.S. Strategic and Defense Relationships in the Asia-
Pacific Region,” CRS Report to Congress, 22 Jan 2007.  See also, Kevin Pollpeter, “U.S.-China Security 
Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship,” RAND Corporation, 2004. 
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competition with the United States lends itself to a comparison with the relationship 
between the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to in the “1973 Incidents at Sea” 
treaty.  Specifically, how do these countries’ relationships compare to each other and 
what direct comparisons can be drawn for future implementation? 
Following the general discussion on international institutions and legal 
agreements ability to address the causes of “naval incidents”, Chapter III takes a more 
specific look at China’s involvement with such agreements.  The first set of applicable 
institutions is international legal agreements such as the UNCLOS.  Next, there are 
several organizations that discuss policies but do not make any binding agreements.  
Additionally, to further draw out Chinese proclivities regarding maritime agreements, all 
of the treaties registered with the UN and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
will be compiled and analyzed.  Finally, what is the level of Chinese compliance with 
each of these international agreements and organizations? 
Subsequent to the perspective on both the theoretical and actual abilities of 
China’s maritime agreements, Chapter IV examines Chinese “naval incidents” since 
Beijing’s admission into the UN.  This thesis does not attempt an in-depth analysis of 
each incident, but rather looks at the broader trends regarding factors and causes of 
“naval incidents.”  Coupling each historical incident with their causes and exacerbating 
factors gives a broad overview of what circumstances could lead to increased tensions, 
within the Asia-Pacific region and with regard to China.  Understanding and cataloging 
historical examples provides a sounding board for the current treaties, agreements, and 
protocols that govern maritime activities in the Pacific Ocean.  Also, further dissecting 
each occurrence, a detailed account of what the root causes were for the inception of the 
incident, along with any exacerbating factors frames each instance.  Historical examples 
are drawn from a variety of sources: any available accounts of incident reports, 
governmental Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports regarding individual 
situations, as well as journal, periodical, and internet articles discussing any of the 
incidents. 
Finally, Chapters V and VI deal with the analysis of the data compiled and offer 
recommendations for future policy choices.  These assessments and conclusions are 
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drawn from the empirical data studies conducted in Chapters II, III, and IV.  These data 
augment more anecdotal evidence drawn from some secondary sources as well as 
interview responses from several policy experts in the field. 
D. SCOPE, DEFINITIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
Moving forward, the presence of the PRC on the world stage and within the 
Pacific Ocean needs to be dealt with.  The question that most are asking deals with what 
type of China that the United States will need to deal with rather than the mechanisms 
needed to deal with that China.  While the nature of the Chinese development, whether 
peaceful or bellicose, is no doubt important regarding implications for the long-term, this 
thesis will assume that uncertainty and avoidance are not the best methods to forestall 
tensions or conflict in the Pacific Ocean.  Instead, preempting assumptions via explicit 
policies and engagement is the path to preventing most future conflict. 
To properly address this topic, this thesis limits its scope to historical cases after 
the UN’s acceptance of Beijing as the government of China.  Incidents that have occurred 
since this date reflect the same basic maritime order that still exists today, namely, that 
the United States is the guarantor of both freedom of navigation and security on the high 
seas, and in the Pacific Ocean specifically.  Additionally, this time period marks China’s 
emerging status in the world order, specifically its continued involvement in the global 
maritime commons. 
Another potential for increasing the reach of this thesis would be in the form of 
classified information.  While this tack would seem to have the potential to add insightful 
and meaningful depth to the discussion, this thesis will keep the argument to an 
unclassified level.  The author also argues that, while potentially very interesting, any of 
the historical examples that could possibly be gained from the classified level would not 
have any discernible impact on the analysis of PRC’s foreign policy.  This is due to the 
mere fact that if those events are still classified, they were most likely dealt with at the 
classified level and not by the unclassified treaties, agreements, or protocols designed to 
handle various occurrences. 
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Instead, a focus on the unclassified, germane historical examples will help assess 
the factors that could shape the current maritime situation in the Pacific Ocean for the 
PRC and, more generally, for the United States.  The comparison of the various examples 
of international legal agreements should sketch a picture of the current state of affairs, 
specifically pointing out where potential flashpoints may develop unchecked by current 
maritime governance.  If this comparison illuminates a hole in the coverage between the 
precedent and the actual, then it will be quite obvious what issues must be addressed in 
order to bridge the gap.  If all the historical reasons for increased tension are addressed, 
then the question becomes what areas need to be reinforced to ensure no future lapses in 
coverage occur.  This thesis looks at whether these issues are addressed well and, if not, 
how they could be dealt with in the future to prevent unintended escalation after an 
incident. 
The implications of this assessment of international legal agreements in the 
maritime realm are salient for assessing emerging patterns of cooperation and conflict 
within the Asia-Pacific region.  What is germane for future policy implications is how the 
United States can shape and use the international legal agreements and institutions within 
the Asia-Pacific in order to prevent an escalation in tensions with the PRC and advance 
U.S. national interests. 
To what extent do international institutions use maritime agreements to reduce the 
risk of a Chinese naval incident and how do those same institutions provide reassurances 
to the various actors involved?  This question is important in understanding the nature of 
both the existing system of international institutions and the possible extent of future 
agreements.  There are many forms and derivatives of organizations that perform 
governance in some manner throughout the world, with the words used to describe them 
just as varied.  Since these terms have meant a great deal of things to a great number of 
people and to prevent any chance for misinterpretation, a common understanding is 
needed for the terms: “naval incident,” “maritime agreement,” “international legal 
agreement,” and “international institutions” or “maritime regime.” 
The sounding board that this paper uses to test these various maritime agreements 
against will be any “naval incidents” where China had a role.  “Naval incidents” should 
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be viewed as encompassing more than just explicit combat by the PLAN.  A broader 
perspective is needed, taking into account any maritime incident, or group of actions, that 
involved some measurable show of force, either posturing or actual use of it.  What a 
naval incident is not is just as important as what it is.  A naval incident does not include 
any occurrence between various maritime actors that does not involve a state’s military 
forces, particularly the naval forces of that country.  However, naval incidents are events 
that occur within the maritime environment that require the use of a country's naval (or 
military) forces, either in action or in threat of action.  Moreover, the distinction between 
threats and action is irrelevant to the effect of international institutions so long as naval or 
military forces are involved in some fashion. 
Viewed in a hierarchical manner from the rudimentary to the most complex (also, 
synonymous with the level of commitment required from the participants), the first order 
of international institutions comprises the various informal councils, discussions, and 
consortiums that are used to open dialogue between nations and act as the first layer 
diplomatic engagement.  These groups can form either ad hoc or on a more regimented 
basis and can result in understandings that are either formally signed or informal, 
unsigned agreements.16 
Maritime agreements comprise the second order of governmental mechanisms 
used by states.  A maritime agreement can be either signed or unsigned and must deal 
with some issue pertaining to the maritime or its effects and conduct therein.  To answer 
the original question of this paper, only those maritime agreements that have some direct 
or indirect impact on the security environment for which they are written are examined.  
However, for this thesis, the term “maritime agreements” is used to refer to all 
international maritime treaties, agreements, and protocols in which the Chinese 
government participates.  An additional constraint is placed on the international legal 
agreements that are examined, limiting the scope of inquiry to include only those that the 
PRC, or the PLAN by extension, has signed. 
                                                 
16 A note on unsigned treaties or agreements for this paper:  if it is unsigned it has to have some form 
of documentation to prove the actors are participatory, or at least tacitly amenable to it (e.g. a statement, a 
declaration, etc.). 
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Functioning as a bridge to the next order of government, international legal 
agreements, similar to maritime agreements, are circumscribed to a narrow issue.  
However, the key distinction is that these are formal, signed agreements that could have a 
larger overall structure but are still germane to a specific maritime issue.  In other words, 
any legal agreement between two or more countries that covers a specific policy area 
pertaining, in some fashion, to the maritime realm. 
The final governmental order is comprised of international institutions or 
maritime regimes.  Mark J. Valencia views regimes as: 
...sets of implicit or explicit principles (beliefs of fact, causation, and 
rectitude), norms (standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations), rules (specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action), and 
decision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and 
implementing collective choice) around which actors expectations 
converge...  Implicit in this definition is that regimes can define the range 
of permissible state action by outlining explicit injunctions.17 
 
Valencia’s definition of regimes is particularly insightful and succinct.  However, 
two additional characteristics should be noted.  One, that international institutions or 
maritime regimes are organizations consisting of more than one state and that are 
comprised of multiple maritime agreements or international legal agreements.  Two, 
these are agreed to either in signature, by verbal acknowledgement, or in practice (i.e. the 
state/actor has performed according to the agreements of the Institution or Regime more 
than once). 
More generally, specific “maritime agreements” should be part of other, broader 
“international institutions” and “maritime regimes” that can help China’s increased 
interaction with the rest of the world continue peacefully.  The issues that need to be 
addressed include misunderstandings that can escalate tensions, territorial disputes, 
                                                 
17 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 225.  Footnote #10: Drawn from Stephen D. 
Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes as intervening variables” in International 
Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1–21; and, Robert O. Keohane, 
“The demand for international regimes,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 325. 
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navigational, and specified use (fishing and mineral) rights and privileges.18  
Additionally, “emerging regional security concerns such as piracy, pollution from oil 
spills, safety of sea lines of communication, illegal fishing, and exploitation of others' 
offshore resources” could all lead to conflict if not sufficiently addressed by the 
appropriate international institutions that govern the area.19  More specifically, there 
needs to be immediate emphasis on the least committed end of the agreement spectrum, 
with long term planning for dealing with the more complicated and delicate issues.20 
  
                                                 
18 For a discussion on the importance of international legal agreements see generally: Valencia. 
“Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 229 (223-247). 
19 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 224. 
20 Mark J. Valencia. “A Maritime Security Regime for Northeast Asia,” Nautilus Institute, Policy 
Forum Online 07-065A, 30 August 2007, online: 
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07065Valencia.html, accessed: September 3, 2007. 
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II. HISTORICAL TEMPLATES FOR FUTURE CHINESE 
COOPERATION: THEORY, INCSEA, AND THE U.S.-SOVIET 
RELATIONSHIP 
Maritime regimes are constructed of multiple levels and various facets, yet a key 
in understanding them comes with an understanding of the theory behind the structures.  
Additionally, any analysis of the theory behind maritime agreements needs to be 
juxtaposed with a historical context in order to lend an understanding of future potential.  
First, to look at the structure this chapter will examine some of the theory behind 
international institutions, treaty development, and regime sustainment.  Specifically, do 
maritime regimes have any distinguishing characteristics that are universally applicable 
or are they case specific?  What issues do maritime regimes deal with well and what 
issues do they typically have problems dealing with?  Also, what cases are relevant for 
the Asia-Pacific region in general?  More specifically, this chapter will provide the 
historical understanding needed to ensure that the expectations set for future Chinese 
maritime agreements are realistic and in line with previous successes and failures. 
Second, the next portion of the chapter will take an in depth look at a previously 
successful treaty, specifically, the “1972 Incidents at Sea” treaty (INCSEA).  There are 
several important reasons for this comparison, but primary among those is the fact that 
the agreement was successful in helping forestall conflict between the two superpowers 
of the Cold War.  Secondarily, if China continues to grow at its continued pace, it will be 
in the position to challenge the United States, even if the nature of that challenge is 
different than that posed by the Soviet Union. 
Third, this chapter will build on both the theory and the historical analysis by 
comparing the country that was involved in the original agreement, the Soviet Union, 
with the country for which future applicability needs to be measured, the PRC.  While the 
INCSEA treaty is being used as an example of a successful treaty, there may be some 
provisions that are more applicable than others due to changing circumstances.  In 
analyzing these aspects of maritime institutions this paper will turn to the data compiled 
by the Correlates of War (COW) project for the baseline data that will be used to 
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compare each of the countries.  This data, while not all-inclusive, is particularly 
exhaustive in the realm of conflict causation and will be sufficient to draw the similarities 
and differences between the PRC and the Soviet Union. 
A. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, AGREEMENTS, AND TREATIES 
1. Generalities and  Theory 
Some scholars argue that for security management institutions “power and selfish, 
national interests remain important in security relations.”21  However, what is also 
important is not necessarily why the security regime is dealing with a problem, but rather 
the method it uses to cope (i.e., the important variable is “path-dependent”).22  
Additionally, these institutions form in small steps, escalating one step at a time in 
response to a certain issue. 
While a state’s self interest does seem to have some impact on the formation of 
security institutions, the various other mechanisms at play when security institutions form 
are myriad, multifaceted and ever-changing.  Several characteristics bridge the theoretical 
divide and are generic in the formation of security management institutions: 
1. State’s self-interest.  While the practice of divesting power to a security institution 
seems to run counter to the notion of a state’s sovereignty, it can actually work to 
its benefit in the long run (i.e., to receive long-term gains, states are willing to 
give up short term power).23 
 
2. “Dilemma of Collective Goods”24.  Some sort of external event that is the object 
of either “collective aversion” or “collective interest,” an event whose “origin is 
[some] combination of imposition, spontaneous processes, or negotiation.”25  
Additionally, at the point when a regime is formed a state’s security has moved 
beyond the point where its military alone can assure its safety.  Instead, states 
                                                 
21 Helga Haftendorn, et al. Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, New York, 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Janice G. Stein. “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” Chapter 12, Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, et al., Washington, 
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001: 189-208. 
24 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building.” 227. 
25 Ibid, 227. 
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must actively engage in the “basic standards of good neighborliness” to ensure 
their safety and survival.26 
 
3. Confluence of events.  According to one scholar, catalysts for formation of 
security regimes are “issue density and a tight linkage of ideas” between the 
issues.27 
 
4. Structure.  The framework that allows the security regime to form is equally 
important to its goals and objectives.28  This structure can affect how the 
cooperation plays out and not all the outcomes result in security regimes (Figure 
2).29 
 
5. Cost vs. Benefit Analysis.  Essential for the successful formation and sustainment 
of a security regime is its ability to affect the cost-benefit analysis of states that 
are involved. 
 
Figure 2.   “Variation in Security Coalitions” (From: Haftendorn, Imperfect Unions)30 
 
In any security regime the delineation of what actions are compliant or non-
compliant becomes vitally important, creating an atmosphere where reputations matter 
and non-compliance is increasingly costly.31  One scholar also describes the importance 
                                                 
26 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 224. 
27 Haftendorn, et al. Imperfect Unions, 27. See also: Robert Jervis. “Security Regimes,” International 
Organization, Vol. 36, No 2, Spring, 1982: 357-378.  
28 Jervis. “Security Regimes,” 357-378. 
29 Figure 1 is from Figure 1.1 in: Haftendorn, et al. Imperfect Unions, 27. 
30 Haftendorn, et al. Imperfect Unions, 27.  Figure reprinted verbatim from Haftendorn et al., who 
retain full copyrights. 
31 Jervis. “Security Regimes,” 357-378. 
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of reputation, sustainability, reciprocity, and repetition in negotiations and individual 
actors’ willingness to enter or negotiate within regimes.32  Over time, this can lead to an 
internalization of the values and norms of the very institutions or regimes that create 
them.  An important aspect of this internalization is the ability of epistemic communities 
to affect the calculations of what actually is the state’s self-interest (i.e., it is the ability to 
shape the definition of self-interest that matters).33 
2. Maritime’s Reality 
With the theory behind the costs and benefits of international security regimes, 
what aspects of the treaty are applicable to a regional maritime regime?  Specifically, 
what would a maritime regime for the Asia-Pacific need to address or what hurdles could 
be expected while building such a regime?  First, what can a maritime regime hope to 
provide?  One author seems to think that: 
Regimes fill one or more of three critical needs: (1) they establish a clear 
legal framework with liability for actions; (2) they improve the quality and 
quantity of information available to states; and (3) they reduce transaction 
costs.... Regimes thus create the conditions for orderly multilateral 
negotiations, legitimate and de-legitimate different types of state action 
and facilitate linkages among issues.34 
Second, expounding on this basis of security regimes is a stipulation that maritime 
security regimes are a “system of governance [with] structure, objectives, functions, 
powers, processes, and programs.”35  These five traits are key to assessing the viability of 
various regimes around the world and in examining any regimes for the Asia-Pacific.  
There are two important aspects of these five traits to look at while assessing a maritime 
security regime, namely the objectives and the functions. 
The second half of the maritime regime assessment looks at the functions within 
those regimes.  The varying levels of development may not be clearly distinguishable in 
                                                 
32 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 227 (223-247). 
33 Ibid, 227. 
34 Ibid, 226. 
35 Ibid, 231. 
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operation, but there is a sufficient division to be useful in analyzing maritime security 
regimes.  The four levels of functions within maritime regimes are:  
[The] first level involves service, that is, information exchange...A 
[second] higher functional level involves norm creation and allocation, 
which includes the establishment of standards and regulations and the 
allocation of costs and benefits.  The third level, “rule observance,” 
includes the monitoring and enforcement by the regional organization of 
the norms and agreed standards.  At the highest functional level are 
“operational” multilateral organizations concerned with implementing the 
norms for management of resource exploration and exploitation activities, 
technical assistance, research analysis, and development.36 
Largely, maritime regimes look to foster cooperation over narrowly defined sets 
of problems and issues.  However, over time, if success is first achieved, the regime can 
hope to expand its influence and coverage by the mere nature of regimes.37  However, 
this change will depend on the reciprocity of the parties involved, as well as the shared 
set of goals needed to begin such an undertaking. 
While there are many things that a maritime security regime cannot do (not to 
discuss whether or not it should), there are equally many issues that they can handle well.  
Maritime regimes should only be expected to grow slowly and not in a rapid or 
comprehensive fashion.  The laborious, time-consuming process needed to develop 
regimes that help to assuage the fears of status quo states.  By slowly chipping away on 
an issue, maritime regimes address issues in a manner that can be equally acceptable, or 
at least palatable, for all actors involved.  While this can seem tedious if only using 
results as the measuring stick, the incremental process is essential to develop a certain 
degree of acceptance for each new policy measure.  Any extra time given to 
normalization and internalization prior to subsequent policy implementation increases the 
effectiveness, potency, and chances of success for a maritime regime. 
Additionally, maritime security regimes can act as a conduit for communicating 
issues and grievances.  The ability of maritime regimes to provide a standardized set of 
                                                 
36 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 227. 
37 G. John Ikenberry. “Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar 
Order,” International Security, Vol. 23, No 3, Winter 1998/99: 43-78. 
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operating protocols is critical to its success.  The procedures provide a framework for 
states to acknowledge status quo behavior, with definitions and means to monitor non-
compliance, thereby providing an excellent venue for signaling.  This “track two” 
communication is crucial for governments that need to execute foreign policy away from 
their domestic or, sometimes, international audience. 
A by-product of facilitating communication for maritime security regime is the 
establishment of an epistemic community.  These informal groups, when brought into 
frequent contact can form bonds that encourage developments in problem areas by 
breaking down barriers to understanding.  These communities also disseminate norms 
and values of the regime through discussion and dissection of policies and issues.38 
In addition to those things that maritime regimes can do well, there are several 
items that should not be dealt with by a maritime regime.  First, the prevailing political 
situation will trump most regimes and could derail any previous gains unless significant 
roots have not been planted already.  Deep seated political inclinations and stereotypes 
cannot be changed by a maritime regime.  However, these political inclinations can be 
swayed with time spent engaged in these cooperative efforts and not any by any specific 
mechanisms of the maritime regimes.  Second, even though maritime regimes currently 
exist in some fashion, many have not moved past inception.  While increasing 
globalization has increased awareness of maritime issues, the catalyst that is needed to 
solidify the establishment of these maritime regimes is still lacking. 
Finally, and perhaps the greatest challenge to maritime regimes, is the issue of 
time.  Many of the gains that such regimes can offer increase as time goes on, increasing 
the benefits for cooperation concurrent with increasing the costs of loner behavior.39  The 
length of time needed is often greater than many domestic, or perhaps international, 
political cycles and it is difficult for politicians and managers to realize the payoff for 
cooperation.  Therefore, the challenge is to convince states that cooperation is working in 
their benefit.  This is another good reason to use small, incremental steps and processes 
                                                 
38 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 227. 
39 Jervis. “Security Regimes,” 357-378. 
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for managing maritime security regimes, perhaps giving all parties small, incremental 
spoils to demonstrate the benefits of the regime. 
B. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT: 1972 “INCIDENTS-AT-SEA” 
Despite the myriad and vigorous saber-rattling incidents that both sides of the 
Cold War (i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union) engaged in, neither side sought a 
conflict born out of confusion or an unintended catalyst.  As the Cold War was reaching 
its height in the 1960s, the Soviet Union’s maritime activities were undergoing dramatic 
changes concurrent with heightened military tensions.  The confluence of increasing 
military tensions and burgeoning Soviet maritime presence led to numerous “naval 
incidents” between the two superpowers, with many accusations and complaints lodged 
by both sides.40  With a common anathema recognized, the United States and the Soviet 
Union had the incentive to create a mechanism that could forestall just such an 
unintentional conflict.  The product of this cooperation resulted in the Agreement 
between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High 
Seas, more commonly known as the 1972 Incidents-at-Sea Agreement (INCSEA).41 
1. INCSEA:  The Background 
After the end of World War II the Soviet Union faced a completely new world 
order where their view was largely shaped by both their loss of 22 million people and the 
emergence of the United States as the sole superpower.  The confluence of these two 
factors led the Soviets to view the world through a national security lens that shaped their 
foreign policy during the beginning of the Cold War.  Moreover, the Soviet Union’s 
 
 
                                                 
40 For U.S. and Soviet examples see: David F. Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 
Incidents at Sea Agreement,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No 2, April 2005: 362-4.  Also, 
footnote #10-13, for discussions and references to many U.S. complaints and cases of Soviet hassling. 
41 For basic regime formation and importance of a catalyst or shared desires, see: Haftendorn, et al. 
Imperfect Unions.  For maritime regimes, see: Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 223-247. 
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development of a forward deployed naval force correlates to other developments within 
not just their military but also their diplomatic, information and economic spheres of 
influence.  
 
Figure 3.   Deployment Level per Region ’46-’76 (in Thousands of Ships) (From 
Dismukes, Soviet Naval Diplomacy)42 
 
A key determinant for this change was the shift within the Soviet Naval forces 
from a littoral force to a navy that was projecting its forces and power throughout the 
Mediterranean Sea and the world’s oceans.43  This increase in sphere of influence is 
clearly evident not only in the Soviet Union’s area of primary concern, the Mediterranean 
Sea, but also every other major body of water as well (see Figure 3).  By the mid-1960s 
this naval competition accelerated as the Soviet Union began to field a truly “blue-water” 
navy with the advent and commissioning of several new vessels designed with this 
                                                 
42 Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, eds. Soviet Naval Diplomacy, Elmsford, Pergamon 
Press Inc., 1979: 43.  Figure reprinted verbatim from Dismukes and McConnell who retain full copyrights. 
43 David F. Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” The 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No 2, April 2005: 368. 
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specific capability.44  Moreover, 1967 marked the de facto shift in terms of forward 
presence on the world stage with significant augmentation to their Pacific Ocean force 
and forays into the Indian Ocean.  The Soviet’s burgeoning “blue-water” navy was now 
in a position to exert increasing pressure on U.S. Naval forces around the world. 
While there were relatively few overt conflicts between U.S. and Soviet naval 
forces during the late 1950s, the early 1960s began a new era of increased naval tensions 
between the two countries.  In addition to the developing naval tensions there was also a 
significant number of incidents involving sundry merchant, commercial, fishing and 
‘other’ (i.e., the so called AGI, or Auxiliary, General, Intelligence) vessels.45  
Extrapolating potentially useful information from these many incidents can be facilitated 
by examining each incident for specific characteristics and then grouping those similar 
incidents together. 
In order to have a data set that is comparable to the timeframe being looked at 
with regard to the PRC, the incidents will be bounded by those occurring after July 25, 
1953 (e.g., the signing of the armistice to end the Korean conflict) through the beginning 
of the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989.  Additionally, this study of U.S.-Soviet incidents 
will be coded from over five hundred incidents recorded in Cold War at Sea.46  While 
there are no doubt incidents that were not reported in this collection of incidents, the 
sample is never the less a broad cross-section of events significant enough to represent 
the more general trends in the U.S.-Soviet naval relationship. 
Each naval incident was coded according to the nature of the incident and 
assigned a value based on five possible categories: territory, collision, harassment, 
misperception, and weapons lock.  The first category includes incidents in which one of 
the two sides was within the boundaries of the other nation’s territory.47  The second 
                                                 
44 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 365-367. 
45 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 362-5. 
46 David F. Winkler. Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the 
Soviet Union, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2001: 177. 
47 This coding is not taking a stance on which side is correct in their assertions or claims regarding a 
certain geographical area.  Instead, this code simply acknowledges that the incident arouse surround one 
side or another’s claims to a particular area. 
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category includes incidents where at least one vessel from both sides come into contact 
with each other.  Additionally, this category includes those incidents that involved near 
misses and situations where one side was forced to take evasive action (i.e., last minute or 
last ditch efforts) in order to avoid a collision.  The third category includes those 
incidents in which there is a perception of malicious intent behind the actions of or 
repeated efforts to hinder the other state’s vessels.   The fourth category includes 
incidents in which one or both of the side’s fails to perceive some aspect of the situation 
that leads to some form of rule breaking.  The fifth category involves incidents in which 
one side aims, positions, tracks, or otherwise engages a ship or aircraft of the other side 
with a weapon system (i.e., a targeting drill that does not involve any form of live fire).  
Finally, there is an ancillary category that was coded on top of all the others which 
involved incidents where one or more of the actors was a land based, non-TACAIR 
(Tactical Aircraft, i.e., the aircraft does not takeoff or land on an aircraft carrier or other 
ship) aircraft. 
Figure 4 represents all of the incidents that have been coded and compiled into 
their various assigned categories.  The aggregate picture that emerges from this graphical 
representation of the incidents is one clear period of elevated occurrence prior to 
INCSEA and a lesser period of incident proclivity afterwards.  The first spike in incidents 
is one of the significant byproducts of an emerging Soviet presence.  This increased 
presence resulted in the collisions, many more near misses, and countless cases of 
harassment which combined to increase tensions during the second half of the 1960s (see 
Figure 4).  A specific episode that exemplifies this was a series of engagements between 
U.S. and Soviet naval forces in early May 1967 that resulted in two separate collisions.  
The first of these collisions occurred between the USS Walker and the Soviet Destroyer 
Besslednyy on 10 May 1967.  The second collision was between the USS Walker and the 
Soviet Destroyer Krupneyy on 11 May 1967.48  Both of these collisions involved 
shouldering, essentially harassment, of the Soviet ships by the USS Walker.49 
                                                 
48 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 365-6. 
49 Shouldering is a technique used to essentially harass the other boat by using the technical details of 
the Rules of the Road to disadvantage the other vessel.  While this tactic is widely used in yacht racing, it is 




Figure 4.   U.S.-USSR Naval Incidents, by Type (’53-‘88)50 
 
At first glance, Figure 4 appears to depict two distinct periods of increased 
incidents, one occurring prior to INCSEA and one occurring after INCSEA.  Despite this 
appearance, the increased number of non-TACAIR incidents artificially inflates the 
second group of incidents.  Additionally, this period saw a significant increase in the 
number of “weapons lock” incidents, which, while being incidents that need to be 
addressed, are secondary in concern to the occurrence of “harassment” and “collisions.”  
Looking past these two categories the picture becomes clear that there was a decrease in 
occurrence of the two issues that were of greatest concern prior to the agreement. 
Despite the fact that there was a relative decline in the most egregious incidents 
after INCSEA, there still remains an elevated incidence of events in the early 1980s that 
needs to be explained.  While some of the naval incidents that occurred were noteworthy, 
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many were not particularly interesting as separate incidents.  Instead what is important 
with regard to these incidents was the fact that each one had the potential to be the spark 
that could have lit the fuse of a Soviet-American conflict.  Additionally, each incident 
cannot be separated from the larger world situation and the tensions that permeated 
thinking in Washington and Moscow.  These larger events ranged from everything as 
catastrophic as the Cuban missile crisis, in the early part of the 1960s, to the regional 
conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, Vietnam, and, more generally, Czechoslovakia. 
So, in examining why there was an elevated level of incidents in the early 1980s it 
is necessary to turn to broader U.S. and Soviet situations.  First, the Soviet Union had 
recently invaded Afghanstan in 1979.  This is significant because it was the first time that 
the Soviet Union had used force outside of the communist bloc since WWII.  Second, in 
the United States, Ronald Reagan was just elected President and both his viewpoint and 
his policies were conspicuously anti-communist.  This change in U.S. domestic politics 
coupled with increased fears about Soviet intentions ushered in a new era of hard-line 
approaches toward the Soviet Union.  The new U.S. attitude manifested itself in the 
maritime realm in the rapid growth and deployment of the U.S. Navy.  The confluence of 
changing attitudes and increased presence resulted in the increased occurrence of 
incidents evident in Figure 4. 
2. INCSEA:  The Formation 
Stepping back, what was the impetus behind the agreement itself?  By looking for 
broad trends and characteristics of the incidents both before and after INCSEA’s signing 
some of the reasons behind Washington and Moscow’s impetus for the agreement itself 
can be illuminated.  So, if preventing potentially provoking incidents was their goal, what 
type of incidents did they need to worry about?  Generally, most incidents involved some 
measure of harassment by either side in the form of spying, attempting to disrupt 
formations and maneuvers, and other such passive-aggressive actions. 
Despite the fact that there were a significant number of near misses and outright 
collisions, these situations were not the most troublesome from the perspective of an 
unintentional war.  While colliding with your adversary’s vessel is not at all ideal, and 
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potentially inflammatory, it is nonetheless an incident that leaves less open for 
interpretation and is more a function of, or more correctly a failure or lack of 
understanding of, the Rules of the Road.  Further, assuming both sides do not engage in 
kamikaze attacks, suicide tactics, or the like, there is little tactical advantage to colliding 
with the opponent’s vessel.  Therefore, the policy makers who are removed from the 
action should be able to analyze the incident correctly as an accident without the fog of 
emotion clouding their judgment.  While a collision will no doubt have both sides 
lodging accusations against the other and those immediately involved with the incident 
quite agitated, ideally those with the perspective from headquarters will analyze the 
situation with more perspective.  On the other hand, there is no doubt that a collision at 
sea poses significant risk to the crew and equipment on both sides.  There is always the 
potential to loose both vessels and all of the crew if there were to be a particularly 
devastating collision.  Having a straightforward case of failure or lack of compliance with 
an acknowledged set of rules stands in contrast to the other incidents which are more 
likely to breed conflict, like the 83 incidents of harassment and fifteen instances of 
misperception that occurred prior to the signing of INCSEA.51  
Just what was it about the incidents other than “collisions” that made them so 
potentially dangerous?  This inherent danger was due to the fact that most of these other 
incidents were left to the interpretation of the individual actors rather than the 
implementation of some larger policy prescribed by the States or, in the case of the Rules 
of the Road, by the global commons or Res Communis.  The enemy to both sides was not 
the act itself but instead the interpretation of the act or actions of the other side that was 
so potentially harmful.  Specifically, the harassment that was conducted by both sides had 
the potential to provoke strong emotions on the part of the tactical operators.  If these 
emotions then subsequently affected the judgment of that commander, i.e., “in the heat of 
the moment,” then both sides could find themselves potentially committed to act due to 
circumstances that in no way reflected their national interests. 
                                                 
51 Numbers compiled in Figures 4-7.  All data for the figures is from, Winkler. Cold War at Sea, 177. 
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3. INCSEA: The Agreement 
INCSEA was designed to address the void of norms and accepted conduct for 
both navies.  There was a common need to have the rules and regulations explicitly 
stated, allowing for a clear distinction of actions that were in compliance or when an act 
of ‘defection’ was occurring.52  Designed with a foundation of the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (i.e. the Rules of the Road), the INCSEA 
developed from various international precedents.  In fact, the INCSEA is very specific 
when it clearly and explicitly states its justification: 
The Parties shall take measures to instruct the commanding officers of 
their respective ships to observe strictly the letter and spirit of the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, hereinafter 
referred to as the Rules of the Road.  The Parties recognize that their 
freedom to conduct operations on the high seas is based on the principles 
established under recognized international law and codified in the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the High Seas.53 
With the framework and basis for the cooperation established, the two 
governments set about normalizing the conduct of their two navies on the High Seas.  
The specifics of conduct were delineated in articles one through five in an attempt to 
reduce situations where confusion and misunderstanding could breed undesired 
outcomes.  Article one outlines the specific participants and forces that are covered by the 
agreement, specifically defining what the terms “ship,” “aircraft,” and “formation” mean.  
Having these clearly delineated bounds for the agreement provides for a manageable 
problem for which the agreement is the solution.  Without these clearly drawn lines the 
agreement would most likely have failed due to alternate interpretations by each party 
depending on their own perspectives on what is and what is not included.  Similar to 
article number one, article number two establishes the basic rules that both parties should 
follow outside of the specific ones generated by INCSEA.  Both article one and two 
                                                 
52 Haftendorn, et al., Imperfect Unions.  Also: Janice Stein. Behavior, Society and Nuclear War: 
Volume Two, eds. Philip E. Tetlock, et al., New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1991: Chp 1. 
53 “Agreement Between The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas,” 25 May 
1972, online: http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4791.htm, accessed: July 8, 2007. 
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provide the building blocks for the agreement itself while at the same time establishing, 
both figuratively and literally, the baseline “rules of the road.”  
Moving to further define the specific intended interactions for the two navies, the 
agreement outlines some additional intent or meaning on top of the foundation 
established in articles one and two.  The eight sub-paragraphs each handle one particular 
aspect of seamanship that could potentially lead to an incident even if both sides were 
adhering to the “rules of the road.”  The sixth sub-paragraph is a particularly poignant 
example of this: 
Ships of the Parties shall not simulate attacks by aiming guns, missile 
launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a passing 
ship of the other Party, not launch any object in the direction of passing 
ships of the other Party, and not use searchlights or other powerful 
illumination devices to illuminate the navigation bridges of passing ships 
of the other Party.54 
The expanded regulations outlined in article three are handled in a particularly 
adroit manner.  Specifically, they are written in such a way to provide the intent of the 
rules without placing to narrow a constraint on either side’s tactical commanders.  At first 
this might seem like a clever political trick, to provide the rhetoric for the politicians 
without giving any teeth to the agreement.  But what is really accomplished by the clever 
wording is enough flexibility for the Captain at sea to conduct operations safely while 
concurrently placing sufficient limitations to hold him to account should his actions 
deviate from the nation’s guidance or “strategic intent.” 
Articles four and five follow closely with the tone and intent of article three.  
These two articles further delineate specific responsibilities for commanders operating in 
close proximity to the other Party’s forces.  Additionally, both articles specifically outline 
the particulars surrounding the use of aircraft, the vessels that carry or launch them, and 
other aspects of each party’s aviation conducted “on and over the high seas.”55 
                                                 
54 Incidents at Sea Agreement, Article III, sub-paragraph 6.  United States and U.S.S.R., online: 
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4791.htm, accessed: August 7, 2007. 
55 Ibid. 
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Next, articles six and seven clearly outline terms for additional items of 
compliance and non-compliance.  While the provisions for articles one through seven are 
not all encompassing, they establish a vital framework for standard behavior.  The 
mechanisms of the treaty also provide for a means of higher-level communication 
through nuanced behavior and signaling without the need to make open statements to that 
effect. 
The final portion of the agreement puts in place the mechanisms for repeated 
evaluation and adaptability of the treaty.  This is the critical portion of the treaty and the 
portion that deserves a great deal of credit for its success.  Specifically, it is this last 
portion that makes the treaty durable and flexible enough to ebb and flow with the 
currents of international relations- specifically the relationship it was meant to foster.  
Additionally, a unique aspect of the continuation and annual review portions of the treaty 
was its Navy-to-Navy format, with the State Departments as aides and advisors.56 
4. INCSEA: The Evaluation 
Just what does ‘success’ mean for the INCSEA treaty?  In this case, success 
should be measured in the treaty’s ability to forestall naval incidents, while at the same 
time successfully facilitating a peaceful resolution to those incidents that did occur.  
Assuming success, one author views the success of INCSEA as due to several factors: the 
utility to both sides, the simplicity, the professionalism of both navies in conduct and 
intentions, the durability of the review process, the agreement’s ability to avoid the 
political spotlight, and, perhaps most importantly, “INCSEA was easy to verify and made 
it easy to hold violators accountable.”57  While the agreement was no doubt designed to 
reduce the occurrence of naval incidents, in no way was it meant to prevent all such 
incidents from occurring.  Moreover, INCSEA’s real strength was in its ability to manage 
those incidents that did occur by maintaining regular and recurring forums, an 
acknowledgement by both sides that States conduct their business through humans, who 
have the potential for error. 
                                                 
56 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 369. 
57 Ibid. 372.  Also,  footnote #47, in same, for expounding information regarding verification. 
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Even with several trying periods coming on the heels of the signing of INCSEA, 
the agreement was able to successfully forestall conflict in the most tense of situations.58  
One example of this was during the 1973 war in the Middle East when INCSEA faced a 
situation that tried the merits of the agreement.  During this time the Soviet Navy 
increased its presence in the Mediterranean Sea by 34 surface combatants and 23 
submarines, raising the combatant total to over 150 U.S. and Soviet Naval vessels.59  
Despite the rapid escalation in support of each side’s allies both sides conducted 
themselves in accordance with INCSEA, helping to alleviate any potential U.S.-U.S.S.R 
conflict.  As is apparent in Figure 4, the number of incidents per year during this period 
was decreased from the periods prior to INCSEA.  This decreased incident activity, 
however, could be partly due to both sides’ not wanting to escalate the regional conflict 
into a superpower war.  An especially noteworthy comparison, however, is the 
juxtaposition of this period during the 1973 war and the period during the 1967 Arab-
Israeli war.  In both cases there was a considerable increase in the naval forces of both 
superpowers; however, it is very evident that the pre-INCSEA crisis saw a significantly 
increased occurrence of naval incidents compared with the 1973 war. 
A comparison between both the number and type of incidents before and after 
signing INCSEA bring into stark relief the important role that the agreement played in 
mitigating the potential for conflict between the United States and USSR (see Figure 5).  
Breaking down the incidents into different categories helps to distinguish those 
occurrences that are more germane to conflict from those that either aren’t as salient to 
conflict or cannot be addressed in a treaty such as INCSEA.  The most important two 
categories are those of harassment and collisions, for many of the same reasons outlined 
already in this paper but, specifically, because both of these types are left open to 
                                                 
58For more detail on additional events that exemplify the successes of the INCSEA: David F. Winkler. 
“The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” The Journal of Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 28, No 2, April 2005: 369-371. 
59 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 369-371. 
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interpretation by the tactical operators.60  Moreover, these two types of incidents are the 
most likely to occur and, therefore, are deserving of extra attention due to their proclivity. 
 
Figure 5.   Pre- & Post-INCSEA Totals 
 
Within each of the potentially provocative types of naval incidents there was a 
substantial decrease in occurrence from before the signing of INCSEA.  In the case of 
incidents involving harassment there was nearly a twenty percent decrease, from nearly 
half of all naval incidents down to only 29 percent during the period after INCSEA was 
signed.  Additionally, with regard to incidents involving collisions, there was almost a 
fifteen percent decrease in occurrence, down from almost 39 percent to fewer than 25 
percent. 
Despite the successful decrease in percentage occurrence in the categories that 
INCSEA was primarily concerned with, there was an increase in two other categories and 
no change in a third.  First, the numbers on the category of “misunderstandings” 
                                                 
60 The specific point is not that all incidents don’t have some measure of interpretation associated with 
them.  Rather that, on a scale where subjective is at one end and objective is at the other, territorial disputes 
are more towards the objective end of the spectrum.  Of course, this is assuming that territorial claims and 
“Rules of the Road” are clearly defined in the first place, but that is outside the scope of this paper.  
Towards the subjective end of this spectrum lays the incidents of “harassment” and “misinterpretation.”  
Therefore, these are the cases that will most concern this paper and, not coincidentally, these are the cases 















remained essentially static at eight percent of all naval incidents.  Second, the percentage 
of incidents involving a “territory” aspect more than doubled, going from four percent to 
nine percent.  Third, the percentage of “weapons lock” incidents dramatically increased 
from only five percent up to 30 percent. 
The dramatic increase in “weapons lock” incidents could be potentially 
worrisome for both those engaged at the tactical end and those at the policy making end 
of U.S. foreign policy.  There are several potential explanations behind this large 
increase: one, there is an increased level of fidelity due to the cooperation and 
communication established by INCSEA; two, that the advancement in weapons 
capability over time has left the forces more susceptible to this type of incident; and, 
three, that each side had found this loophole that would permit harassment without open 
violation of the INCSEA’s various provisions. 
Of the three possible explanations, only the second possibility seems to pose a 
problem that would be beyond the scope of INCSEA to handle.  Weapons advancement 
might pose a problem by changing the risks associated with certain behavior.  This could 
manifest in the ability of one side to successfully engage the other from an increased 
distance or simply to detect from a greater distance.  Either way, advancements in 
weapons could render an agreement ineffective due to a shift in the underlying 
assumptions that both sides have regarding their security.  Alternatively, the regular, 
recurring meetings that were required by INCSEA would be more than capable to deal 
with both of the other two possibilities.  Specifically, the first case is basically an instance 
of a problem that is having the spotlight placed on it and once the spotlight is on the 
problem it could be dealt with.  Similarly, the third case can be handled by INCSEA’s 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
More broadly, INCSEA serves as a great example of a how institutions need to be 
able to change over time.61  INCSEA demonstrates the ability of agreements to begin 
governing over a narrowly defined issue but, once established, can be the springboard for 
                                                 
61 Janice G. Stein. “Image, Identity, and the Resolution of Violent Conflict,” Chapter 12, Turbulent 
Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, et al., Washington, 
U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2001: 189-208. 
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broader, farther-reaching agreements, cooperation, and regimes.62  One of the specific 
items this new treaty addressed was the increase in ‘gun tracking,’ more basically, fire 
control engagement systems locking onto and tracking the other side’s platforms, of both 
ships and aircraft.63  This type of incident increased from a practically non-existent nine 
occurrences prior to the INCSEA treaty to an astounding 81 instances afterwards.64  The 
adaptability of INCSEA manifested itself in the “Prevention of Dangerous Military 
Activities Agreement” that was signed between the United States and the USSR on June 
12, 1989.  This agreement addressed the issues that had been continually dealt with over 
the subsequent annual INCSEA review meetings and codified them into a bilateral treaty.  
Moreover, the strength of the treaty also served to ameliorate some of the larger political 
tensions.  This was evidenced during the late 1970s and early 1980s when increased 
tensions between the two countries left the INCSEA and, therefore, the navies, as the 
only military-to-military tie between the two countries.65 
One of the major reasons for the success of INCSEA was due to the built-in 
flexibility and adaptive mechanisms, specifically the yearly review process.  In a similar 
manner, one of the hallmark features of democracy’s success is the institutionalization of 
regular and recurring elections.  This aspect of democracy is undoubtedly one of the key 
elements in the continuing legacy and stamina of democracies more generally.  Elections, 
which are known to be recurring and regular, ensure the rights of the loosing party to 
contest the power of the winners within a reasonable timeframe and in a known manner.  
The importance of this cannot be overemphasized.  By establishing the rules of the game 
and ensuring the loosing party will have another chance at power in the future the 
government helps to establish its legitimacy and militates against domestic strife.  Two 
scholars give an excellent summation of this point: 
                                                 
62 While the INCSEA agreement began with a very circumscribed purview, only one year passed 
before the treaty was broadened to include civilian merchant shipping and other non-military vessels on the 
high seas. 
63 David F. Winkler. Cold War at Sea, Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 2001: 177. 
64 See Figures 5 for percentage decrease. 
65 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 371. 
 33
In a democracy, representatives must at least informally agree that those 
who win greater electoral support or influence over policy will not use 
their temporary superiority to bar the losers from taking office or exerting 
influence in the future, and that in exchange for this opportunity to keep 
competing for power and place, momentary losers will respect the 
winners’ right to make binding decisions.  Citizens are expected to obey 
the decisions ensuing from such a process of competition, provided its 
outcome remains contingent upon their collective preferences as expressed 
through fair and regular elections or open and repeated negotiations.66 
Just as democracy builds legitimacy through regular and recurring elections, so to 
did INCSEA strengthen its validity as an agreement by instituting the annual review 
process.  Having the forum to air grievances and the knowledge that they would be 
addressed prevented any isolated incident from recurring.  This annual review process 
created a de facto insurance policy for both sides of the superpower rivalry.  This 
insurance policy guaranteed that both sides “minority rights” would be protected and 
addressed in a regular (every year) and known (through bilateral meetings) process.  This 
frank and open process was something unique to seasoned diplomats and “State 
Department observers on the U.S. delegations were often taken aback at how readily each 
side accepted responsibility for errors and moved on.”67 
C. CAN YOU “INCSEA” WITH A DRAGON? 
Since the INCSEA was clearly successful in the case of the Cold War, can it be 
applied today between China and the United States, or for the Asia-Pacific region more 
generally?  In order to ascertain the applicability of this agreement it is necessary to look 
at three equally important factors surrounding this discussion.  First, to what degree can 
you equate the PRC of today, or in the potential near-term, with the Soviet Union of the 
Cold War leading up to the signing of INCSEA and afterwards?  Second, what is the 
potential for a future Sino-American conflict sparked by or instigated in the maritime 
domain?  Third, looking at the historical precedent of Chinese involvement with such 
                                                 
66 Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl.  “What Democracy Is... and Is Not,” in Essential 
Readings in Comparative Politics, ed. Patrick O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski, New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 2004: 225. 
67 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 370. 
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agreements over the past several decades will augment the theoretical analysis of the 
Chinese inclination towards any potential maritime agreements.  Combining these 
disparate aspects of the current Chinese experience within the global commons will 
illustrate the prospects for future engagements and interaction with the Middle Kingdom.  
1. Does “Bear” = “Dragon” (or “Panda”)? 
The potential for and applicability of an INCSEA style agreement for the PRC 
will, in part, be determined by the degree to which China today compares with the Soviet 
Union of the Cold War.  This section will look at the elements of each country’s political 
economy, military capacity, and diplomatic proclivities in order to determine any 
common threads.  The identification of these similarities will define the boundaries of 
applicability of previous models along with the areas where there is hope for future 
Chinese cooperation.  Moreover, this comparison will draw out the particular points of 
emphasis needed in constructing any such agreement.  On the surface there appears to be 
some broad characteristics that are shared between the Soviet Union of the Cold War and 
the China of today.  
a. Economic Situation 
Looking at each state’s economic foundation there seems to be a 
particularly strong resemblance between the two countries.  These similarities are most 
evident in several particular sectors within the economy, specifically, general maritime 
industries (including shipbuilding) and the energy usage of each country.  Despite the 
similarities in some aspects of the economic sector there are several areas that are quite 
dissimilar, with a good example being the basis of the economy itself. 
The Soviet Union’s seaborne trade nearly tripled from 1950 to 1970, with 
an even larger increase in the percentage of that trade being conducted by Soviet vessels.  
Specifically, the rapid growth in Soviet maritime trade during this timeframe resulted in 
total trade growing to 121.3 million, up from 44.3 million tons.68  Moreover, the Soviet 
                                                 
68 Winkler. “The Evolution and Significance of the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement,” 373, footnote 
#5. 
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Union was using 70 percent of its own shipping by 1970.69  This growth in shipping and 
shipbuilding was undoubtedly coupled with an increase in the overall presence of the 
Soviet Union on the high seas. 
Similarly, China has experienced over 5 percent growth in maritime 
transport every year since 2000 and finally broke into double-digit growth in 2005 with a 
10.3 percent growth rate.70  China’s shipbuilding industry (SBI) has continued to build on 
its successes and garner an ever-increasing portion of the world market share within 
international shipbuilding, growing from 11th in the world in 1991 to 3rd in the world with 
23.5 percent of the world market share at the end of 2006.71  Most notably, these gains 
have come in spite of downturns in demand in the mid-1990s and after the Asian 
Financial Crisis (AFC).  Since the turn of the century, China has steadily increased its 
capacity (Figures 6) concurrent with increased use of sophisticated shipbuilding 
techniques. 
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Figure 6.   Tonnage Delivered by Chinese Shipyards, 1981-2004 (From: Medeiros, A 
New Direction for China’s Defense Industry)72 
 
Looking further into the economics of both countries, there is a pretty 
significant correlation between the two countries energy consumption (Figure 7).73  As is 
evident in the graph, both countries exhibit a very similar trajectory of growth in energy 
consumption throughout the 30-year comparison period.  It is important to note that even 
though there is a difference between the actual amounts used by both countries, this is to 
be expected with such a large difference in population size.  Specifically, the Soviet 
Union held an average of just over two-hundred million people throughout the 30-year 
period, while the PRC held over 1.1 billion people through the same period.  This 
difference in population explains the delta between the two values in real terms. 
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73 Data in figure from the C.O.W. report.  Specifically, the Composite Index of National Capability 
(CINC).  A graph of this data is shown in figure 13.  For additional information, see: J. David Singer, Stuart 
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Figure 7.   Energy Consumption (Thousands of coal-ton equivalents)74 
 
The steady increase in energy consumption by both countries speaks to the 
growth sought after by both state’s governments.  The fact that the PRC today is looking 
to channel most of its resources into economic development as opposed to the Soviet’s 
emphasis on military growth is perhaps a defining difference.  Yet, even as both countries 
diverge in their intentions, they both still require increasing amounts of energy to 
accomplish their goals.  Moreover, the confluence of the PRC’s emphasis on economic 
development along with the increasing demand for energy to support that effort points 
toward a Chinese maritime expansion. 
While the discussion so far has outlined some very important and salient 
aspects of each country’s economy that are similar, the fact remains that the basis for 
each country is now very different.  This difference is the command or planned economy 
of the Soviet Union as compared with the current market based economy in China.  
Despite each country having similar starting points, the paths that each took in the time 
                                                 
74 Both lines represent a 30-year period for each country.  However, for the USSR the years 
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period in question portray a development that is quite distinct from each other.  While the 
Soviet Union continued with its planned economy until its ultimate demise, the PRC has 
moved towards a free market economy while maintaining the ideological inclinations 
within their domestic politics, specifically the within the CCP. 
During the time-period in question, both countries experienced a marked 
increase in their overall maritime presence, both in production and activity, had 
significant growth in their overall energy consumption, and yet both countries pursued 
opposite forms of governmental market control and intervention. 
b. Military Capability 
In recent years there has been much fanfare over the emergence of the so-
called “China threat.”  The discussion on China’s growth, however, lacks substantial 
evidence to point to exactly what type of threat that will entail?  Will China grow to 
become a “peer” or “near-peer” competitor vis-à-vis the United States similar to the 
Soviet Union of the Cold War?  Or will its growth only produce a regional challenger that 
does not attempt to project its power worldwide but is content to exert only regional 
influence?  This paper will examine a comparison between the two country’s military 
power beginning with an overall assessment, moving on to strategic considerations, and, 
finally, will look at the actual hardware and deck-plate level detail. 
A broad perspective on each country’s military capability can be discerned 
from looking at each country’s composite index of national capability (CINC) 
overtime.75  The data show an interesting correlation between the USSR and the PRC, 
specifically looking at a ten, twenty, and thirty year period.  This period is from 1952 
through 1972, the signing of the INCSEA agreement, for the USSR and 1977 through 
2007 marks the range of years for the PRC.  The first trend that is noticeable is the 
relative stability of the PRC’s graphs across all year ranges.  The PRC has been enjoying 
                                                 
75 Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) is a term used in the Correlates of War project 
from the University of Michigan.  Specifically, “this measure is generally computed by summing all 
observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting each state’s absolute 
component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the 6 components.”  Data 
Available: Singer, et al. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." Also, 
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a steady, but limited growth in their CINC, with the only exception occurring during the 
Tiananmen crisis.  This is in contrast to the relatively erratic fluctuations of the Soviet 
Union’s military capability in their ten and twenty-year perspectives.  Despite the fact 
that there are these differences, the thirty-year graph shows, quit clearly, just how similar 
in slope the two countries’ trend lines are over the long term (Figure 7).76  Moreover, if 
China is able to maintain its growth, it should be able to meet and perhaps even exceed 
the national capability of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.  
Figure 8.   Composite Index of National Capability (per country)77 
 
It is clear that the Chinese national capability is growing vis-à-vis the 
Soviet Union of the Cold War, but what about strategic intentions?  Is there any 
comparison between the aims of the two countries?  One point of similarity between the 
two is undoubtedly their search for technological breakthroughs to enable them to 
leapfrog the United States in military power.  For the Soviets, this technology came in the 
form of nuclear technology for both propulsion and destruction as seen in this passage: 
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timeframe.  These years of fluctuation can be explained as the result of World War II and its aftermath. 
77 Data Available: Singer, et al. "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-
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The breaks of the naval technological race have been a key factor in 
substantially improving the relative Soviet posture vis-à-vis the West- and 
without a proportionate national investment.  For the first time the Soviet 
Navy can pose a direct threat to the continental United States; for the first 
time it can present a serious threat to the American surface fleet; and 
because it is able to do this, for the first time the USSR can become a 
formidable competitor...78 
Part of the reason for the Soviet’s move towards higher technology equipment had to do 
with their general shift in attitude away from quantity towards quality.  In order to carry 
out this shift, one of the main instruments of this qualitative increase was the 
submarine.79  
The Soviet shift from quantity to quality is very similar to the Chinese 
shift of emphasis that is underway today.  Specifically, this change is embodied by a 
move away from Mao’s concept of “people’s war” towards the new emphasis on 
“winning informationaized wars by the mid-21st century.”80  Also, their emphasis on the 
“assassin’s mace” or other revolutions in military affairs (RMAs) is very similar to the 
Soviet focus in the late 50s and early 60s of quality over quantity. 
Looking at the equipment that each country sought it becomes clear that 
both countries were seeking to leverage some form of asymmetric advantage against the 
global hegemon, i.e., the United States.  For the Soviets, their advantage was in part due 
to the technology gains made by their emphasis in quality, but also through their clever 
use of flexible deployment to effectively project power any where in the world.  This 
meant that there was a general acquisition of primarily conventional naval vessels with an 
additional emphasis on the submarine force.  Moreover, the logistical network that was 
needed to support these forward deployed vessels was meticulously maintained and 
cultivated. 
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China today, in a similar fashion, is seeking to modernize its forces with 
increased integration and development of new technologies.  Unlike the Soviets, 
however, there has not been a push to generate a truly “blue water” navy.  Rather the 
emphasis is on increasing their regional presence and expanding their littoral reach, i.e., a 
more “green water” focus.  This focus is evidenced by their focus on developing the 
PLAN with no major forward support structure similar to that of the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War.  Even if the reports concerning forward basing in Pakistan and Burma are 
true, these two support facilities do not even begin to compare to the scope or breadth of 
the Soviet support system.81 
c. Political/ Diplomatic Arrangements 
The impact of the Soviet Union’s experience of loosing approximately 22 
million people in WWII cannot be underestimated in terms of their foreign policy choices 
during the beginning part of the Cold War.  Specifically, this experience led them to 
focus on creating buffer zones, both geographically to the homeland and also for their 
ideological interests abroad (e.g., their third world partners and suppliers).  Despite 
beginning the post-WWII experience of communism undergirding almost all Soviet 
foreign interactions, in the 1960s this myopic idealism was replaced with a more 
pragmatic foreign policy based on real gains for the country.  Moreover, the Soviet’s 
competition for influence in third world countries caused them to relinquish their 
steadfast devotion to ideology and instead focus on a “quid pro quo” approach.82 
China is making many of the same changes today that were undertaken by 
the Soviet Union during those early years of the Cold War.  There are, however, some 
nuanced differences.  While the Soviets moved away from idealism in order to secure and 
expand their sphere of influence the Chinese have moved away from ideology in order to 
join the larger world order, not to separate themselves from it.  Specifically, the ideals of 
                                                 
81 These support facilities included: Egypt, Somalia, Syria, Guinea, Iraq, Yugoslavia, Singapore, and 
Algeria for their naval repairs.  Moreover, the Soviets even enjoyed commercial support for their naval 
merchant marine in such western ports as Spain, Italy, and Gibraltar.  See Table 2.8 in: Diskmukes, p. 70. 
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communism have been subverted for economic development and the maintenance of 
power by the CCP, however that power is held. 
The differences between the two do to not mitigate the fact that the 
Chinese are actively courting several African nations in a nod to Soviet block tactics.  It 
is irrelevant that this courtship is meant to bear economic fruit instead of ideological 
support.  The underlying condition is that both countries are politically engaging the 
periphery of their interests in an attempt to bolster their position, be it economic or 
ideological. 
d. Overall Comparison 
For the Soviet Union, the combination of their increased maritime 
commercial presence and the perception that competition over their sphere of influence 
required advanced technologies83 led to the development of a “blue-water” navy capable 
of challenging the United States on the High Seas.84  China, in a similar fashion, is 
continuing to modernize its navy to increase their ability to maintain the supplies and 
resources needed to continue to fuel the growing economy.85  Yet, even within the 
Chinese expansion is the desire to keep a regional, limited focus for the PLAN. 
The similarities between the Soviet Union and China are significant, 
however there are some differences too.  First, the PRC has yet to fully develop into a 
complete superpower with peer or near-peer capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy.86  
While this in and of itself is not a huge distinction, it does highlight the difference in 
current power between the PLAN and USN.  This could make a difference in cooperative 
relationships when one side has vastly greater power than the other.  Specifically, the 
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chance is that the stronger party could rely on their coercive power rather than submit to a 
cooperative agreement.  Conversely, there is a chance for free-riding on the part of the 
lesser power.  Additionally, while it seems that we are moving towards this peer (or near-
peer) relationship, it could still falter with an implosion of the PRC economically or 
politically.  Whether or not the PRC develops as predicted or not, the previous 
assessment of the PLAN’s capabilities vis-à-vis those of the Soviet Navy’s at the signing 
of the INCSEA will help in assessing the applicability of an agreement today between the 
United States and the PRC. 
The basic ideas behind the INCSEA will continue to be applicable to the 
U.S.-Chinese relationship no matter what development path the PRC follows.  One 
reason is that China's population and situation in the world will continue to place it at the 
center of international relations and commerce within the Asia-Pacific.  Moreover, 
facilitating cooperation to prevent conflict, “naval incidents,” or increased tensions is still 
very useful even if China experienced a dramatic failure in its current development.  Such 
a failure could place increased pressure on the leadership within the CCP to look for 
external diversions to its internal problems.  However, if an agreement along the lines of 
INCSEA was already established, potential flashpoints for conflict could be dealt with 
when cooler heads prevailed. 
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III. CHINESE MARITIME AGREEMENTS 
With a firm grasp of the theory surrounding maritime institutions along with a 
successful historical example Chapter II has provided the needed sounding board from 
which to gage maritime agreements with “Chinese characteristics.”  This chapter will 
take this framework and build upon it by looking at several aspects of Chinese 
involvement with maritime agreements.  First, some of the paramount domestic political 
concerns that will most likely affect the Chinese leadership’s decisions regarding 
engagement of a maritime agreement will be examined. 
The following portion will continue the examination by looking at Chinese 
leader’s decision to sign treaties that are currently on record with the UN.  This will 
provide a baseline for the affects of their domestic politics on their international 
involvement and, more generally, of their proclivity for maritime agreements.  Next, 
specific Chinese maritime agreements along with specific issues relating to each will be 
examined.  Additionally, these specific cases will be juxtaposed with a more general 
study of all the treaties on file with the UN and the IMO.  These treaties will be coded 
using the same methodology that will be applied to each of the naval incidents, coded in 
Chapter IV, facilitating easy comparison.  Finally, a comparison of current Chinese 
maritime agreements to the previously successful INCSEA should reveal strengths and 
weaknesses within the corpus of Chinese maritime agreements. 
Overall, this chapter will help provide the second leg of the triangle of data that 
will be analyzed in Chapters V and VI.  The substance added is the knowledge of the 
particular Chinese experience with regard to maritime treaties.  A specific focus will be 
on what factors drive the Chinese decisions with regard to maritime agreements and, 
more generally, international cooperation. 
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A. THE DRAGON’S LAIR: HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR 
COOPERATION 
1. Domestic Impact on Chinese International Involvement 
The Chinese leaders realize the need to continue the development of their country 
in every aspect, not just economically.  This desire for total reform is gestated out of the 
need to keep political and social development apace with the economic growth of the 
PRC.  With emphasis placed on the economic policies over the past few years the overall 
goals are succinctly stated in the 2006 Communiqué of the 16th Plenum.87  Moreover, 
President Hu Jintao has continued to make domestic politics central to his discussions on 
foreign policy and international relations.  In the 2004 PRC Defense White Paper there 
are five objectives outlined which drive Chinese international dealings and policies: 
...[to] defend national sovereignty…safeguard the interests of national 
development… modernize China’s national defense [via] 
informationalization… safeguard the political, economic and cultural 
rights & interests of the Chinese people... [and] to pursue an independent 
foreign policy of peace.”88 
Several overt and implied messages are contained within this White Paper that 
further outline Chinese interests.  First, Taiwan is, and will continue to be, a major issue 
for the Chinese leadership.  The Chinese leadership makes it very clear that it will 
quickly change focus, from the economic growth of China to the reunification of Taiwan, 
should anything upset the current status quo or especially if any move toward a 
separation occurs.  President Hu stated recently, “the [United States and China] should 
adhere to the principles, honor the commitments and properly handle the question of 
Taiwan in accordance with the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués.”89  Since these 
documents that Hu refers to were established in 1972, it is easy to see that China hopes to 
                                                 
87 Communiqué of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CPC Central Committee, 11 October 2006, online: 
http://www.chinaview.cn, accessed: September 12, 2007. 
88 People’s Republic of China. 2004 Defense White Paper, online: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white, 
accessed: January 15, 2008. 
89 Hu Jintao. President Hu makes proposals on advancing Sino-U.S. relations, April 2006, 
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zmgx/t248819.htm, accessed: December 4, 2006. 
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preserve the status quo.  That is not to say that it does not want Taiwan reunited under its 
leadership, but the Chinese leadership puts a higher value on maintaining its economic 
growth- that a war over Taiwan would undoubtedly affect- ahead of reuniting Taiwan.  
The Chinese will, however, likely risk economic prosperity, and more, should Taiwan 
make the first move. 
More generally, the primary consideration is maintaining regional, and 
increasingly global, stability in order to allow the continued economic development of 
the PRC.  Specifically, the leadership of the CCP knows its legitimacy is tied to the 
economic development and continued prosperity of its country.  While this sentiment also 
covers the Taiwan issue as previously discussed, it also covers much wider regional 
interests.  China is beginning to realize that increased involvement, by the PLAN, in 
regional military operations fosters amicable relationships that can extend into the 
economic realm as well.  Moreover, the Chinese are quite cognizant of the United States’ 
influence in the Pacific and wish to begin to establish influence in the region as well.  
Specifically, Beijing would like to be able to exert influence over their vital sea-lanes, 
while at the same time creating a larger buffer for self-defense vis-à-vis external threats 
(e.g., any Japanese or U.S. actions in the region).  According to some Chinese scholars, 
the reason for the Chinese desire to secure these sea-lanes and buffer seas is because the 
Chinese “view their energy supply as precarious, especially in relation to the United 
States.”90 
2. Data on Chinese Historical Involvement 
For many of the same reasons that were previously discussed, leaders within the 
CCP desire to maintain the nation’s independence concurrent with engagement of the 
global commons.  “China does not pursue hegemony, invasion, or expansion; does not 
form military alliance with any other country; and does not garrison troops or build 
military bases abroad.”91  That being said, stability both within China and in the broader 
                                                 
90 Dr. Wang Wenfeng. Professor, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
in discussion with the author, February 2008. 
91 Chi Haotian. Speech on Defense Policy given to Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies, 
February 4, 1998. 
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regional system is essential for the regime to maintain power.  It is a pretty fair 
assumption that China’s economic development would be negatively affected from a 
destabilized Pacific region.  The extent to which this can be debated is only a matter of 
degree, but no doubt there would be a measure of effect on the PRC following an 
exogenous economic shock.  It follows that future growth and sustainment of the PRC 
can be ensured through engagement of the global commons.92 
An examination of Chinese engagement through historical maritime agreements 
can help develop some broader trends in their interaction with those treaties and 
institutions, more generally.  In order to facilitate this examination this thesis will look at 
the basket of treaties that are deposited with the United Nations.  Specifically, the 
resources of the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) will be utilized to provide a 
starting point for examining China’s involvement with maritime agreements.  All parties 
of the UN are required to deposit treaties that they are States Parties of with the 
Secretary-General.93  Specifically, the UNTS is a collection of all bilateral and 
multilateral treaties signed by all member states to the UN.94  While the UNTS is not an 
exhaustive repository of world treaties, for the purposes of assessing Chinese 
involvement over time, whatever bias is present should be consistent across the sample. 
To properly code the data from UNTS, the study was performed via multiple 
searches of the treaty database using different search criteria for each iteration of the 
search.  The primary search criteria used was the date range that a particular leader was in 
power.  This date range provided a starting point for accessing the treaty database.  With 
this date range established, multiple searches within that range were performed using 
several different filters; unfiltered, bilateral, multilateral, or maritime.  The first search 
                                                 
92 This “formalization” can take many different forms.  However, what is important for the purposes 
here is that any move towards engagement is a formalization of the new relationship between China and 
whomever they are dealing with.  For a further detail on the myriad steps of formalization see also footnote 
#19. 
93 “States Parties” is a term referring to a member of a treaty that has agreed to be bound by the terms 
of that specific treaty.  Reference footnote #19. 
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was an unfiltered one that yielded the total corpus of treaties that have been deposited 
with the UN and that were signed under that particular leader.  The second search used a 
filter that looked at the nature of the treaty itself.  Specifically, was this treaty a bilateral 
treaty or a multilateral one?  The third search filter that was used looked to see if the 
treaty pertained to the maritime.  This data was then recorded and compiled to facilitate 
comparison and, as before, illuminate the broad trends in recent history.  Additionally, 
while the categories of bilateral or multilateral are mutually exclusive, the determination 
over whether or not the treaty was maritime or not was made independently of the first 
distinction. 
Once the data was compiled and filtered (see Figure 10), then it was subjected to 
further study whereby each type incident (e.g., maritime, multilateral, or bilateral) was 
subjected to a quantitative filter.  This filter was applied in four different ways: 
percentage of maritime treaties, maritime treaties signed per year, multilateral treaties 
signed per year, and total treaties signed per year.95  The percentage of maritime treaties 
is the only variation of the four filters applied for this analysis.  Specifically, it looks at 
the number of maritime treaties as a percentage of the total number of treaties signed.  
Next, the remaining three filters all take the total number of treaties in their respective 
category and divide that number by the term length of each respective leader.  The result 
shows just how many treaties of that specific type each leader was likely to sign. 
In looking at the data there are several aspects that deserve attention.  What is 
important is to examine the long-term trend-lines and perspectives surrounding Chinese 
leaders’ engagement with the global community via international treaties and, more 
specifically, maritime agreements.  The analysis will involve several comparisons: one, 
                                                                                                                                                 
94 United Nations Treaty Collection, United Nations, 2007, online: 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/faq.asp, accessed: December 7, 2007. United Nations Treaty Series: (14 
December 1946 - February 2005)  “This publication contains the texts of over 158,000 records of bilateral 
and multilateral treaties and subsequent treaty actions in their authentic language (s), along with a 
translation into English and  French, as appropriate.” 
95 The inferred category is that of bilateral treaties signed per year.  This filter was left out because the 
total treaties signed per year less the multilateral treaties signed per year is equal to the bilateral treaties 
signed per year.  Or, more concisely: multilateral treaties+ bilateral treaties= total number of treaties 
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involvement with maritime treaties; two, involvement with multilateral treaties; and, 























Zedong 5 63 54 9 13 20.6 2.6 12.6 1.8 
Deng 
Xiaoping 15 400 368 32 13 3.2 0.9 26.7 2.1 
Jiang 
Zemin 10 206 203 3 3 1.5 0.3 20.6 0.3 
Hu 
Jintao*** 4.75 10 10 0 0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 
Figure 9.   PRC Leadership's Treaty Engagement96 
 
a. Maritime Treaties 
The data generated by this study does not seem to reflect the emerging 
role of China in the maritime commons as purported by their emerging national power.97  
What are striking about the numbers in Figure 10 are not only the relatively low 
percentage of maritime treaties per leader, but also the increasing paucity of the maritime 
treaties over time.  Other than during Mao’s leadership, the average number of maritime 
treaties signed per year has been at one or under (Figure 10).  This data only seems to 
reaffirm the perception of several Chinese scholars who view China as “very cautious to 
engage in such relationships.”98  Specifically, China lacks the confidence to fully commit 
because these types of mechanisms are viewed as being “dominated by U.S. and Western 
interests.”99 
                                                 
96 *Length of Rule, in Years. ** Total Number of Treaties Signed by Leader during Tenure. ***Hu 
Jintao’s numbers are not fully representative of his engagement due to update efficiency with the UNTS, 
where this data originates. ^ Bilateral Treaties. ^^ Multilateral Treaties. (1) % of Total Treaties signed. (2) 
Average Per Annum.  Source:  United Nations.  United Nations Treaty Series, New York, 2007, online: 
http://untreaty.un.org, accessed: December 7, 2007. Multiple searches of the database were performed and 
the data correlated and combined to form this table.  See reference list for websites of each of the treaties. 
97 Refer to CINC comparison for the PRC in Chapter II. 
98 Dr. Wang Wenfeng. Professor, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
in discussion with the author, February 2008.. 
99 Ibid. 
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Perhaps the best case to examine regarding Chinese involvement with a maritime 
treaty is their involvement with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 (UNCLOS).  This agreement “lay[s] down a comprehensive regime 
of law and order in the world’s oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of 
the oceans and their resources.... enshrining the notion that all problems of ocean space 
are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole.”100 
Beginning in late 1973 the UN began construction of what is now known as the 
UNCLOS by calling for two sessions of the conference on the Law of the Sea.  The 
participation level was outstanding with around 5000 representatives from almost every 
country in the world.101  There is nearly that same level of involvement from today’s 193 
countries with over 155 having signed the treaty or made a declaration to that effect.102 
Despite the exception of some countries, there has been considerable progress 
made with UNCLOS.  Finally ratified in 1982 and in effect since November 1994, the 
UNCLOS has been able to achieve relative success in several areas: 
• Increasingly, UNCLOS is becoming the norm for communication and open 
dialogue on all things maritime, especially procedure and policy.  The importance 
of this cannot be underemphasized.  Establishing a normalized forum for maritime 
issues of governance is vital to any future maritime successes. 
 
• UNCLOS has established rules and regulations for change and adaptation.  The 
success of these institutionalized change mechanisms is evidenced in the two 
supplemental agreements regarding ‘Article XI’ and ‘conservation and 
management’ of certain fish stocks. 
                                                 
100 “Overview,” U.N. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, online: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm, accessed: 
August 26, 2007.  
101 Hungdah Chiu. “China and the Law of the Sea Conference,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, Baltimore, No 4, 1981: 11. 
102 While this seems to be a considerably high participation level, on the list of nine countries that 
have made no acquiescence includes some noteworthy countries: the United States, Turkey, Venezuela, 
Syrian Arab Republic, Israel, Peru, Ecuador, Eritrea, and Timor-Leste.  For a detailed listing of States’ 
accession to the treaty: “Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement 
relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation 
of the provisions of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks.” United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
Office of the Legal Affairs, 7 August 2007, online: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm, , accessed: 
September 19, 2007. 
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In regards to the Law of the Sea, the PRC first engaged with the international 
maritime community in November of 1970.103  China’s beginning position on the Law of 
the Sea seemed to be slightly hedging, while at the same time containing some rhetorical 
aspect for the non-aligned movement.104  Nonetheless, China does have a decades long 
history of engagement with UNCLOS and its various mechanisms.  In looking at this 
history, however, what lessons can be drawn from these examples that would be 
applicable to a future Chinese maritime security treaty (i.e., an agreement similar to 
INCSEA)?  That question can be best answered by looking for evidence of the successful 
qualities of the INCSEA in the Chinese dealings with UNCLOS. 
China’s current involvement with UNCLOS seems to be contiguous with its past 
inclinations toward cryptic posturing and non-committal positions.  Specifically, China 
engages in the treaty to the minimum level required to avoid any outright violations and it 
may follow the letter of the law but very rarely follow the spirit of the law when it is 
against their interests.105  Moreover, China’s ambiguity when it comes to the spirit of the 
laws stands in conflict with one of the significant reasons for the success of INCSEA, 
specifically, the “professionalism in [the] navy’s conduct and intentions.”106 
Additionally, there seems to be evidence of other general trends in Chinese 
behavior that stand counter to the successful actions taken by the United States and the 
Soviets while engaging in the INCSEA.  One of these traits is the ability to avoid 
politicizing the treaty and instead rely on rational interactions between the members.  
While the INCSEA was able to function as well as it did partly because it could fly under 
the “political radar,” it seems that China increasingly uses historical and nationalistic 
claims to bolster its UNCLOS claims on various territorial disputes.  The point is that 
 
                                                 
103Hungdah Chiu. “China and the Law of the Sea Conference,” Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in 
Contemporary Asian Studies, Baltimore, No 4, 1981: 6.  
104Chiu. “China and the Law of the Sea Conference,” 17-25. Specifically, refer to the numerous 
public statements made by the government and the government controlled media. 
105U.S. government source well versed in Chinese affairs, in discussion with the author, February 
2008. 
106See, Chapter II, this paper. 
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placing this political baggage on to various disputes only raises the costs for any 
concession given by the Chinese and, therefore, makes it less likely that a compromised 
solution would be acceptable to the Chinese leadership. 
In contrast, China views itself as a pariah state that was let in from the cold only 
recently and, because of this, is very eager to prove their ability within the world system 
in order to gain acceptance.107  Despite some less than productive traits, the Chinese are 
not immune to the pressures from the larger world system.  According to several Chinese 
scholars, the Chinese view the recent unilateral actions taken by the United States as 
being part of a move to abandon the UN framework and, more specifically, maritime 
agreements.108  If the Beijing is working under these two assumptions then it becomes 
very clear why it seeks to maximize their position through abiding by the letter of the 
law, even if this conflicts with the spirit of the law. 
Overall, Chinese involvement with UNCLOS seems to be for reasons more on the 
political end of the spectrum than the tactical, ground level that was characteristic of the 
INCSEA.  This contrast means that many of the advantages of an INCSEA type 
agreement would be lost if China used the same manner of engagement that it used with 
UNCLOS.  Moreover, there is a current anathema towards any type of INCSEA 
agreement in China due to fears of such an agreement admitting to, even if only tacitly, 
an adversarial relationship with the United States.109  This fear would be unfounded, or at 
least largely mitigated, if the Chinese planned to engage apolitically in any future 
agreements of the like. 
b. Multilateral Treaties 
The PRC leaders’ participation in multilateral international treaties and 
agreements seems to correlate with the numbers regarding maritime international treaties.  
                                                 
107 Dr. Wang Wenfeng. Professor, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), 
in discussion with the author, February 2008. 
108 Dr. Niu Xinchun. Professor, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), in 
discussion with the author, February 2008. 
109 U.S. government source well versed in Chinese affairs, in discussion with the author, February 
2008. 
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During the reign Deng there was a deviation from this, in real terms there was over triple 
the number of multilateral agreements signed (Figure 10), but with very little percentage 
change.  Comparing the leaders’ preference for multilateral treaties in terms of 
percentages seems to skew the data.  However, when looked at as the average per annum, 
it is clear that there has been little deviation amongst the various leaders in their 
preference for, or perhaps more correctly their anathema of, multilateral treaties as 
compared to bilateral treaties. 
c. Overall Treaty Picture 
Looking at the data coded from the UNTS, there is a clear preference of 
all the leaders for bilateral agreements.  Additionally, there has been an essentially 
increasing trend in participation with treaties in general since the start of this data (Figure 
10).  Looking at the leaders with the highest percentage of maritime treaty participation 
the feeling is that maritime matters have declined in importance. Even with the data 
limitations, President Hu seems to be falling behind his peers when comparing annual 
treaties signed and specifically when looking at involvement with maritime treaties.  This 
does not fit with several of the assertions made earlier in this very paper, however.  So 
what is the discrepancy? 
The spike in treaties in the beginning of the PRC could be a reflection of 
China’s newfound status as a member of the United Nations.  This recently earned status 
would have also carried with it a raft of treaties that were already on the books prior to 
Chinese acceptance of the UN.  Conversely, in real terms, the numbers have remained 
roughly equivalent across the board.  Additionally, rather than the high percentage of 
Mao or high numbers of Deng reflecting any particular maritime proclivity, perhaps they 
are representative not of maritime treaties decreased importance, but rather the increasing 
importance of globalization for all aspects of society. 
Overall, there are several characteristics that can be concluded from the 
treaties that China has signed on to.  First, over time, China has become increasingly 
more selective, resulting in a fewer overall treaties signed as well as those pertaining to 
the maritime realm.  Second, the decrease in the number of treaties bolsters the 
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assessment that China is a reluctant engager.  Third, the fewer numbers of treaties signed 
also points toward a China that is inclined to favor the status quo and tolerates change 
only so far as it has a hand in shaping the nature of that change. 
B. THE DRAGON’S NEIGHBORHOOD: ATTEMPTS AT MARITIME 
COOPERATION 
Relevant international institutions or maritime regimes are going to be comprised 
of those institutions and agreements that only pertain to the maritime realm.  This will 
especially pertain to those that have military (and therefore Naval) aspects explicitly 
addressed.  However, it also means that those institutions and agreements that deal with 
maritime issues that have been historically filled with tension or prone to lead to 
increased military postures will also be included. 
Many of the maritime security regimes that have been attempted are in relation to 
an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea.  Some of these maritime regimes include attempts in 
the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the North Sea, and the Arctic Ocean.110  The gains 
won for each regime are individually important for their respective regions, however 
what is salient for the application to the broader Asia-Pacific region is the fact that each 
of these regimes was the result of an incremental process. 
Within the Asia-Pacific region, the most notable example of maritime cooperation 
and regime building has occurred and is taking place within the South China Sea.  Some 
of these efforts include the 1976 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation (1976), the 
ASEAN declared goal of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (1971), the 1992 
ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, and “the repeated Indonesian South china 
Sea Workshop Statements” outlining the member states’ desire to cooperate in dispute 
resolution.111  The groundwork laid by ASEAN has provided for a forum where 
maritime regime potential and particulars in the South China Sea can be discussed.  
While there has been no great strides made in this area, at an ASEAN summit in 2002, 
the countries agreed to a Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  
                                                 
110 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 233 (223-247). 
111 Ibid, 239 (223-247). 
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Despite the fact that this agreement was non-binding to any of the involved parties, the 
declarations do give hope for continued, future cooperation by stating: 
The Parties reaffirm their commitment to the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and other universally recognized 
principles of international law which shall serve as the basic norms 
governing state-to-state relations.112 
It is clear that the rhetoric is there, but is it backed up by actions?  According to 
one scholar, effectual, real cooperation, due mainly to domestic and international political 
legacies, is still not a reality.113  Additionally, continued strained relationships over 
disputed territories and a raft of other maritime issues continue to militate against more 
cooperative engagement. 
1. United Nations’ Treaty Series and the International Maritime 
Organization 
Stepping back a level from specific treaties and focusing on a broader swath of 
treaties that they are signatories of will provide a more general understanding of Chinese 
inclinations.  Additionally, this should help to facilitate any future treaty negotiations 
with transparency, generally, as to what the areas of interest will be.  A good place to 
start in this general treaty study is with the treaties of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) combined with those compiled by the UNTS.114  In order to get a 
broad perspective on the current state of Chinese involvement with both of these treaty 
sets the data will be coded by agreement type.115 
                                                 
112 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, ASEAN, 4 November 2002, online: 
http://www.aseansec.org/13165.htm, accessed: September 9, 2007. 
113 Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building,” 223-247. 
114 This treaty sample is not all encompassing but, rather, is meant to offer a broad enough sample to 
be able to generalize the Chinese position on these matters. 
115 These data types are the same as used by the Correlates of War (COW) project to code each of the 
militarized incidents they track. Coding the treaties in this manner should allow for easy comparison from 
the incidents that have occurred to the treaties that are on the books and, therefore, easy extrapolation to 
areas requiring attention.  For more information on the COW data types refer to Appendix A. 
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One of the first issues to deal with in looking at this data is the disparity between 
bilateral and multilateral treaty involvement.  The data in figure 10 shows that the 
Chinese favor bilateral agreements over multilateral ones.  This inclination manifests 
itself in over 93 percent of the agreements being bilateral.  This in and of itself does not 
make the PRC exceptional, many states seek to reduce the cost of their involvement by 
limiting the number of parties they are beholden too (as explained further in Chapter II).  
Moreover, looking at only those treaties that are maritime in nature reveals that 21 of 29 
treaties, roughly 72 percent, are bilateral in nature.  While this represents a slight 
decrease of the inclination to favor bilateral agreements, it still points toward a strong 
Chinese anathema for multilateral agreements. 
Figure 10.   PRC Maritime Treaties, by Revision Type 
 
Digging deeper into the data several more points are revealed on top of simply the 
general type of agreement that the Chinese are likely to sign.  There seems to be a 
tendency towards agreements that are based on a single policy issue (see Figure 10).  In 
fact, agreements relating to a single-issue policy choice or standard are more than twice 
as likely than both of the other types of agreements put together. 
The treaties that are represented in the data set all seem to point away from a 













be more treaties and agreements concerning territory, e.g., Taiwan, if it was such a high 
priority for the Chinese. One possible explanation is that there are simply not any 
territorial issues to be dealt with.  Quite clearly territorial issues are, as has been shown in 
various other channels, a high priority for the Chinese. 
C. SUMMARY 
Overall, Chinese involvement with maritime agreements has been fairly active 
throughout the post-reform period.  These general inclinations combined with a detailed 
investigation of the specific maritime treaties of the PRC facilitate these assessments 
along with several others.  First, there has been an almost steady increase in the level of 
involvement with general treaties and, more specifically, a roughly steady engagement 
with maritime related treaties.  This trend shows both the Chinese emergence after 
reforms and the effects of globalization, more generally. 
Second, while there has been a generally increasing trend in overall involvement, 
this involvement masks the actual tendency for limited engagement.  Why would 
increased involvement in treaties point towards a move away from commitment?  This is 
partly due to the fact that the majority of Chinese involvement has seen a heavy 
inclination towards bilateral agreements as opposed to multilateral ones.  As has already 
been discussed, this means there is a much lower threshold of commitment required on 
the part of the Chinese.  Looking at the percentage change over time, there has been a 
steady decrease in the likelihood of a leader to sign a multilateral treaty (Figure 10).  This 
seems to indicate that even as the Chinese are engaging the global commons, they seek to 
maintain a level of control over the markets (and countries) that they are engaging with.  
Essentially, it is easier for their statesmen to manipulate and influence a bilateral treaty 
than a multilateral one.  Moreover, “it is better for China not to have an agreement than 
be in one at all [sic] that you [i.e., China] can’t control.”116 
Third, looking at the specific example of UNCLOS coupled with the more general 
assessments from the UNTS and IMO treaties there is further evidence of the Chinese 
                                                 
116 Dr. Wang Wenfeng. CICIR, in discussion with the Author, February 2008. 
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desires to maintain a non-committal posture.  This evasive behavior can best be seen in 
the wording of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.  
While not openly evasive, one of the fundamental tenets in article one is the “Five 
Principals of Peaceful Coexistence.”  Again, while this is not openly elusive, the idea of 
non-interference has always been one of the realities of the “Five Principals” for China.  
Moreover, China has used this principle as the basis for inaction and to shirk 
responsibility in the past.  Overall, this provision seems counter productive in the 
formation of a regime that was designed to cede some state sovereignty in order to gain 
long-term stability. 
Further, looking at the types of coded treaties there seems to be an association 
between the level of commitment required and the likelihood of occurrence.  Assuming 
that treaties covering specific policy issues require less commitment than those 
concerning how to govern over a specific interest and both of these types cost less than an 
agreement regarding Chinese territory. 
While this study only comprised the many Chinese treaties and maritime 
agreements that are on record with the UN, a brief look at the larger picture will help 
bring these specific examples into context.  Largely the efforts to engage in regional and 
global international institutions have not progressed much further than the discussion 
stage for the Chinese.  The best example where Chinese cooperation has progressed is 
with the UNCLOS.  The Chinese cooperation with respect to this treaty has been 
significant, as mentioned before, but there are some recent developments that augment 
the findings from the treaty study.  One example of a deviation from this treaty occurred 
in the fall of 2007 when the Chinese port of Hong Kong denied permission of two U.S. 
warships to seek refuge from storms.117  This action was in clear violation of customary 
maritime practice and the UNCLOS, more specifically. 
                                                 
117 This incident is not to be confused with a similar incident only a couple of weeks before this one 
when a U.S. aircraft carrier was denied entry.  The difference is that the carrier was operating under normal 
circumstances where all normal rules of diplomacy can be used, while the two other warships were clearly 
in jeopardy and were denied assistance by the port of Hong Kong.  For incident details see: Thom Shanker. 
“China’s Denial of Port Calls by U.S. Ships Worries Navy,” The New York Times, 28 November 2007, 
online: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/28/world/asia/28navy.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin, 
accessed: February 26, 2007. 
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IV. CHINESE “NAVAL INCIDENTS” SINCE 1971 
A. INCIDENTS 
Coupling each historical incident with their causes and exacerbating factors 
should give a broad overview of what circumstances could lead to increased tensions, 
within the Pacific maritime region.  Understanding and cataloging any historical 
examples provide a sounding board for the current treaties, agreements, and protocols 
that govern maritime activities in the Pacific Ocean. 
The data compiled in Figure 16, utilizing the Correlates of War (COW) project 
information, provides a clear picture as to what the most likely and, also, the least likely 
incident types are.  Moreover, it gives needed perspective on which of the areas are the 
most likely flashpoints for future Chinese naval incidents.  More specifically, these 
incidents can provide the details of what issues need to be addressed by future 
governmental instruments. 
In order to have a data set that is manageable and relevant, this thesis will utilizes 
the Correlates of War (COW) project data.  This data set compiles a manner of variables 
regarding war and warfare along with various other aspects of state’s power, more 
generally.  For this study, the coding that is completed by the COW project will be 
assumed valid.  Additionally, there was a need to separate out only those incidents that 
pertained to China and the maritime realm.  This filtering was accomplished using the 
incident descriptions and additional documentation provided along with the COW study.  
Moving to the coding itself, each naval incident was coded according to the nature of the 
incident and then assigned one of several possible categories (as defined and documented 
in COW).118 
In order to look deeper at the implications of the cumulative data from the 
incidents, a need arises to examine the top four, accounting for 85 percent, most likely 
                                                 
118 Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, 
Coding Rules, and Description," Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, 2004:133-154. online: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/, accessed: 10 February 2008. 
 62
incidents: “Show of Force,” “Alert,” “Seizure,” and “Threat to Use Force.”119  Each of 
these incidents will be analyzed through the lens of the possibility of escalation or 
conflict.  This grouping should help correlate the underlying modes of each incident and 
aid with baseline analysis and predictions for policy recommendations.  The “Alert” 
category, however, will most likely not add any particular insight into this study and will, 
therefore, not be analyzed.  Additionally, an examination of those incidents that result in 
actual conflict and not just increased tensions will provide a baseline for potential 
flashpoints. 









Threat to use force Threat to declare war Show of force Alert Fortify border
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Figure 12.   Incident Action by Type, 1993-2001120 
 
The Chinese incidents involving a “Show of Force,” similar to the title itself, 
mostly involve some form of military sortie to the area.  This increased presence can take 
                                                 
119 While the 1995-96 Taiwan crisis seems like an obvious omission, this was done intentionally.  
Specifically, the Taiwan Strait crisis of ‘95-6 was a political and military action that resulted in a naval 
escalation as the finale, but the incident as a whole was not provoked within the maritime realm.  For this 
analysis the goal is to illuminate potential escalations from “naval incidents,” not overt acts of aggression.  
However, this incident is included in the Appendix for reference. 
120 Most of the data represented is from the Correlates of War (COW) project.  However, the author 
compiled several of the incidents and the aggregate is what is represented here.  For citations and a list of 
the incidents represented along with their descriptions refer to the Appendix. 
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the form of army, navy, or air forces but seems to always involve more than just placing 
the forces there.  The ‘extra’ that is typical of the incidents seems to include some sort of 
demonstration of the forces capabilities, either in the form of “warning shots” in the most 
extreme case to just the simple maneuvering of fighters on the mild end.  A good 
example of this type of behavior was when, in 1995, the Chinese sortied fighters toward 
the Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands, to the Japanese) and threatened to penetrate 
Japanese airspace (or actually did penetrate it, depending on the report).  Several more 
poignant examples of this occurred throughout 1999 when increased tensions over 
Taiwan caused several rounds of muscle flexing that resulted in Chinese fighters crossing 
the line separating Taiwan from the mainland.121 
A couple of points are drawn from these incidents and others, more generally.  
First, the simple escalation of forces is inherently an escalation in affairs at the point of 
the incident.  Next, these incidents seem to involve some form of territorial pressure 
applied on the opponent.  Finally, the fact that these “Show[s] of Force” involve military 
activities in close proximity to another nation’s vessels is inherently susceptible to 
misunderstanding and misperception. 
The incident type that is next most likely to occur is the “Seizure” category that 
seems to be a much more straightforward issue to evaluate than the others.  This is due to 
the fact that there is most likely a physical action that has occurred as opposed to the 
more subjective determinations needed in the various other categories of incident.  
Additionally, these incidents typically involve a non-military actor that is the subject of 
the seizing, usually fishermen.  These incidents fall into the category of incidents that are 
most likely not dangerous at the point of action, but hold more potential for escalation 
with the reaction to the incident. 
A series of incidents in 1995 began and ended with the seizure of fishermen from 
both sides sparking a heightened state of affairs over the disputed area the fishermen 
happened to be working that day.122  When looking at these instances of seizures it 
                                                 
121 See: Appendix, incident “4061” & “4088” for further information. 
122 See: Appendix, incident “4027” for further information. 
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becomes apparent these events stem from a larger national policy.  Specifically, the act of 
“Seizure” is less a punishment for the fishermen’s actions and, instead, more an 
expression or assertion aimed at those fishermen’s government.  The danger here is 
assuming that in taking the other’s players pawns there will not be a tit-for-tat type 
exchange. 
The remaining most frequent incident type is that of “Threat to Use Force” which 
is basically the rhetoric arm of these incidents.  While it is no trivial issue for a 
government to make a declaration over the use of force, it is still, however, considerably 
less likely to lead to an unintended conflict.123  As to whether, on the whole, there is a 
greater likelihood of conflict resulting from a “Threat of Force” as opposed to a “Show of 
Force,” that is beyond the scope of this paper.  Moreover, the statements made seem to 
generally precede a “Show of Force” if the situation continues to progress in an 
unfavorable manner.  One such case occurred in 2001 when, similar to the case in 1999, 
the Chinese threatened to use force in an attempt to quell Taiwanese independence 
moves.  Instead of abating Taiwanese independence measures, however, this action 
provoked a response of a show of force from both Taiwanese fighters and a subsequent 
Chinese military exercise.  Moreover, these developments drew a response from a third 
party, the United States, further exacerbating the situation. 
Finally, in just looking at the most frequently occurring types of incidents does 
not mean that those that occur less often are not significant.  Rather, the greater the 
frequency of occurrence the greater the chances are of elevating the costs associated with 
the action for the other side and for that type of incident to lead to an escalated situation 
in the future.  It is for this reason that the focus is on those four types of incidents that 
have accounted for over 85 percent of the cases.  Moreover, of the remaining types of 
incidents only the “Threat to Declare War” and “Blockades” hold potential to lead to 
unintended conflict.  The other types including “Border Violations,” Fortify Border,” 
“Attack,” and “Clash” all are unlikely to lead to unintended conflict.  The last two may 
lead to conflict; however, these are more likely forms of intentional conflict. 
                                                 
123 One of the assumptions here is that when a government makes a position know it is actually that 
position which they wish to advance as opposed to a diplomatic feint. 
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B. PROCLIVITY AND SYMPTOMS 
So what exactly do these incidents tell us about the Chinese maritime presence?  
Are they indicative of future Chinese behavior or are they simply one-off occurrences 
that don’t provide any useful generalizations?  These incidents, despite occurring over a 
score of years, do have some common threads that are useful to untangle when looking at 
the potential for maritime agreements.  First, while some of these incidents were resolved 
well and others were not, a good portion illuminate the need for a mechanism for 
resolving disputes and airing grievances.  Additionally, most incidents were reported by 
the ‘other’ side (i.e. the state involved in the incident that is not China) and only 
acknowledged by China after the incident was reported in the media. 
Second, some of these incidents seem to have in common a gap in either 
expectations or in perceptions as a factor in their development.  The lack of 
understanding of Rules of the Road, failure to agree on a set border, or lack of 
acknowledgement of another’s sovereign seas are failures to have explicit expectations 
agreed upon by all actors.  It should not be surprising that when expectations are not met 
some sort of conflict, or tensions at least, would arise. 
There are several instances where the divide in the perceptions of both sides led to 
a naval incident.  One specific example occurred in April of 2001, when there was a 
confrontation between several Australian navy vessels and the PLAN in the Taiwan 
Strait.  This incident is particularly relevant because it highlights the importance of 
perception and expectations in precipitating these incidents.  Specifically, the Australians 
viewed the Taiwan Strait as an international waterway that they were entitled to transit 
through according to international law and UNCLOS.  The Chinese, however, perceive 
this strait as being within their territorial seas, in which case the Australians would not 
have the right to transit this body of water without prior permission from the Chinese.124 
                                                 
124 This is only one example of the way in which perceptions can precipitate a naval incident.  For 
more examples refer to the Appendix.  Specifically, incidents: 4063, 4104, 4128, 4278, and 4336. 
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Figure 13.   PRC’s Hostility Level per Action (’93-’01) 
 
Third, looking at the aggregate data on the hostility level that is associated with 
each incident, it seems that the Chinese are more inclined towards actions over words.  
Specifically, looking at Figure 12, it is apparent that over 90 percent of the time the 
Chinese elected to display their power in a “Show of Force” or a “Use of Force.”  The 
fact that the Chinese seem to favor action over words has significant impact on the nature 
of maritime agreements that will potentially deal with this tendency.  The implication of 
this amplifies the need to have agreements in place that are designed and capable of being 
implemented at the deck plate level.  Having such agreements in place will help those 
operating at the tactical level to make decisions that are inline with the desires of national 
policy and agreements and not destined to be escalatory. 
Fourth, and finally, it is very telling to look at only the incidents that resulted in 
the “Use of Force.”  These incidents draw out two specific points; one, that all of these 
incidents except for one125 involve the fishing fleets or fishermen of the other side; and, 
two, that even though these incidents involve claims of infringement on fishing rights 
and, by extension, the sovereignty of the country, they all occurred in disputed areas.  
                                                 
125 The only outlier here is the 2001 EP-3 incident involving the U.S. surveillance efforts in, what 
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Specifically, there were no incidents of fishermen being seized, shot at, or otherwise had 
force used against them in areas that were not under dispute.  This fact points to territorial 
claims being the genesis of this “Use of Force” rather than any sort of policing effort to 
protect their fisheries for their own sake. 
Additionally, the fact that most of these incidents involved actors that were not 
naval forces speaks to the need for a broader scope on any future agreements.  Any 
agreements between two naval forces will only be superficial at best if they do not 
address all the maritime actors, in this case fishermen and their fleets.  Not only should 
the jurisdiction of any such agreement cover fishing fleets but also should extend to 
merchant marine fleets more generally, including tankers and the like. 
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This paper’s analysis will examine several different aspects regarding current 
Chinese options for managing their international engagement.  Specifically, the different 
aspects that will be looked at are: one, the potential for future conflict between the United 
States and China; two, what can be expected from maritime agreements in the U.S.-PRC 
context; and, three, what are the final implications of these analyses and paper, more 
generally?  These different threads in Chinese international relations will help form the 
fabric for involvement with maritime agreements and, more broadly, international 
treaties. 
A. POTENTIAL FOR U.S.-PRC MILITARIZED CONFRONTATION 
So what is the potential for future militarized conflicts between the United States 
and a rising PRC in the maritime realm?  Also, if conflict is likely, what are the potential 
triggers to such conflict?  Can they be identified or perhaps even quantified?  These 
questions are helpful in determining the possibility of any future utility of a Sino-U.S. 
INCSEA agreement. 
1. Resources 
Every country needs to ensure that its production capabilities and supporting 
infrastructure is taken care of.  The problem arises when these countries begin to compete 
over scarce resources.  In the future, it is possible that China could be brought into 
competition with the United States over the sources of these scarce resources.  This 
situation is made particularly acute due to the Chinese sense of vulnerability and 
insecurity surrounding their access to their resources in general.126  These concerns, 
however, are mitigated by the fact that the Chinese also believe that in any competition 
for resources they would stand to loose more vis-à-vis the United States.  This view helps 
to reinforce a cooperative attitude towards resource competition and dampen any 
                                                 
126 Dr. Wang Wenfeng, CICIR, in discussion with the author, February 2008. 
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sentiment for resource exploitation.  Obviously there are exceptions to this resource 
competition as evidenced by the myriad territorial disputes in and around the South China 
Sea where, most likely not by accident, there is believed to be significant mineral and 
resource deposits. 
There are additional potential areas of contention such as fishing rights and 
pollution controls, however, the impact of these areas is not as acutely perceived as the 
need to access petroleum and gas rights.  That is not to say the long term benefits or, 
more correctly, costs of not dealing with or having access two these areas will not have a 
significant impact on the country’s security but that there is a lack of understanding as to 
the immediate importance of these issues.  These areas will most likely be relegated to a 
second-tier level until there are widespread food shortages or pollution effects widely 
acknowledged by either side. 
2. Territory 
The next area of likely dispute between the United States and China involves 
issues of territory and sovereignty.  First, the issue over Taiwan’s independence is a 
significant factor in the Chinese decision-making process and needs to be considered in 
any potential Chinese engagement.  Generally the “Chinese people desire Taiwan to be 
reunified, however, the status quo is ok, but resolution is desirable.”127  Only looking at 
the political actions of the PRC, leaving out the potential uses of military hardware being 
procured, there does not seem to be strong revisionist actions.  The government does not 
seem to be attempting reunification through proactive efforts rather, the main emphasis 
seems to be aimed at maintaining the status quo. 
The United States, similar to China, seeks to maintain the status quo.  This 
position has been espoused by many public officials as well as in many official 
documents such as the “Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic 
Relations” which came into effect on January 1, 1979.  Even given the official position of 
the United States there are some obvious ambiguities surrounding the potential 
                                                 
127 Dr. Wang Wenfeng, CICIR, in discussion with the author, February 2008. 
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involvement of the United States should Taiwan declare independence and subsequently 
draw China into a conflict, while there is less ambiguity of U.S. involvement should the 
Chinese forces invade Taiwan. 
Considering both sides there seems to be little likelihood of either the United 
States or China being the impetus behind any conflict over Taiwan.  Despite these good 
intentions, however, the fact still remains that while Taiwan might not be an independent 
state de jure, it is still an independent actor and exercise de facto sovereignty.  This 
means that both the United States and China will need to continue to exert considerable 
effort to influence Taiwanese actions and prevent any pro-independence moves from 
occurring.  A key tool for both sides would be some form of INCSEA agreement that 
potentially be able to prevent an incident from gaining nationalist sentiment on either 
side.  
Second, while the United States and China have no other direct territorial 
conflicts, there are many neighboring countries that do have conflicts with China.  These 
disputes, however, do not pose a significant threat to sparking a conflict between the 
United States and China.  It is very unlikely that the United States would intervene in 
these regional disputes past a level of rhetoric or perhaps aid or support.  There has been 
no precedent of the United States involving itself in these disputes in the last 30 years 
and, given the increasing diplomatic and economic ties between China and the United 
States, it is unlikely to in the future.  Moreover, these territorial disputes do not provoke 
the same nationalist sentiment within China as is associated with Taiwan, so if the United 
States or another regional power were to exert considerable force over one of these it is 
significantly less likely that China would respond in kind.128  
3. Expansion 
As was evident in the comparison with the Soviet Union of the Cold War, China 
today is moving out into the global maritime commons with increasing frequency.  This 
expansion has resulted in both increased merchant marine forces (Figure 6) and in 
                                                 
128 Dr. Niu Xinchun. CICIR, in discussion with the author, February 2008.. 
 72
expansion of the PLAN in both numbers and capabilities.  The expansion of the PLAN 
has not been uncontrolled and it appears that the Chinese will be limited to a “green 
water” naval force in the near term. 
Additionally, INCSEA was a treaty developed to govern the "High Seas."  
Moreover, this was a treaty born from elevated levels of anxiety and, largely, an 
increasingly crowded Eastern Mediterranean Sea. The current Sino-American 
relationship, however, needs to be able to handle a more littoral and "green water" focus 
and address all "naval incidents."  So, with China’s increasingly “green water navy,” does 
this have any implications for the broader chances of a conflict with the United States 
(i.e., EP-3-like incidents which are more likely in the littoral where naval and air forces 
come into contact)?  The coastal and regionally focused PLAN of tomorrow will present 
new challenges to any agreement that is modeled after INCSEA.  It will be increasingly 
more difficult to sort out the maritime traffic as you move closer to shore.  Moreover, in 
the crowded littorals the decreased fidelity of marine activity increases the chances for 
transnational actors (e.g., terrorists) to capitalize on the confusion. 
B. MOVING FORWARD 
What sort of issues can we expect to be addressed by maritime agreements and 
maritime regimes between a rising China and other Asia-Pacific actors?  With historical 
precedence as a guide, there seem to be several readily addressable issues along with 
some other, more peripheral items.  First, narrowly defining the issues to be addressed is 
key to the success of any maritime agreement.  Making to broad or sweeping claims will 
result in alienation of one or more of the actors participating and will most likely stall the 
agreement in the discussion stage. 
Second, having clear, easily measurable mechanisms is a big catalyst in 
solidifying the status of the regime.  While this aspect doesn’t help in regime formation, 
any maritime agreement will be better off if there is less room for diplomatic 
maneuvering and the more the agreement holds actors to account for their actions.  
Additionally, ever increasing globalization and China’s “green-water” focus mean that 
many actors will have access to the littoral marine domain which may not share the 
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maritime heritage that was a common, baseline understanding shared by the two navies 
who signed INCSEA.  In any future maritime agreement, this potential gap in common 
understanding needs to be bridged through a much more detailed delineation of daily, 
tactical operations and how they will be conducted. 
Third, time is central for any maritime regime.  Time permeates all the other 
factors within regimes, both in the formation of them and also in strengthening them after 
formation.  Regime mechanisms such as reputation, reciprocity, and repetition in 
negotiations, along with several other facets, all gain strength through the passage of time 
and number of iterations.  There is a need to introduce the “bezel” concept in our 
agreements, i.e., you can always schedule meetings more frequently than is originally 
stipulated in the treaty but you cannot extend the interval between meetings. 
Finally, with sporadic and largely nascent attempts in the South China sea, and 
very little in the way of cooperation in NEA, the AP is still a ways from forming a 
maritime security regime.129  Policy makers should look to develop the regional 
cooperative regimes that one day may form a broader Asia-pacific regime.  The fact that 
most countries (over 157) have agreed to UNCLOS means that the foundation is already 
there to be built upon.130  With that solid foundation and the supporting regional pillars, 
once they are solidified, it will only be incremental steps that are needed to build an Asia-
Pacific maritime regime. 
C. SINO-AMERICAN MARITIME AGREEMENTS 
There are several important factors regarding domestic politics within the PRC 
that have ramifications on future U.S.-PRC cooperation.  First, the CCP plays a key role 
in and has significant influence over the full spectrum of Chinese policy formulation and 
                                                 
129 Mark J. Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast 
Asia,” Ocean Development & International Law, Vol 31, 2000: 242. 
130 “Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the implementation of the 
provisions of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks.” United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of 
the Legal Affairs, 7 August 2007, available: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm, , accessed: 
September 19, 2007.  See also footnote #1. 
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implementation.  The importance of maintaining the rule of the CCP should not be 
underestimated regarding its involvement with international treaties.  “If they [the 
Chinese leadership] are [sic] secure in the belief that China’s national face is respected in 
the international community, the Chinese people will marginalize parochial 
nationalists...and demand that their leaders behave like superior men.”131  Moreover, in 
order to facilitate this goal, the CCP has begun slowly aligning its basis for legitimacy 
with the economic success of the country.  The slow erosion of the ideological 
underpinnings means the CCP will bend ideologically to facilitate economic ends. 
Second, it would be mutually beneficial to use domestic law as the baseline for 
international agreements.  This will have the dyadic affect of increasing the legitimacy of 
that particular maritime agreement while at the same time increasing the legitimacy of the 
CCP by reinforcing its own country’s laws.  The simple fact that China believes in rules 
is a factor that bodes well for future cooperation.  By accepting the use of international 
rules as a norm, China is already tacitly, if not overtly, agreeing to the basic fundamentals 
of the world system, as it exists today.  Just because there is rhetoric surrounding the so-
called “Beijing approach” does not detract from the fact that they respect rules in a 
general sense.  To the contrary, this exemplifies China’s acceptance of and willingness to 
use the world system as it exists today. 
Third, globalizing forces are changing the face of cooperation for all players in 
the global commons.  On the face of the data in Figure 10, it seems there is an erosion of 
maritime cooperation to foster cooperation on myriad other levels.  While this increased 
cooperation is vital to continued growth both in the world economy and individual 
countries, it is important to keep sight of the fact that over 90 percent of the world’s trade 
is still conducted via seaborne routes.132  This underscores the importance of maintaining 
maritime cooperation alongside increased cooperation in other areas. 
                                                 
131 Peter Hays Gries.  China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004: 29. 
132 World Globalization Index 2007, AT Kearney, Inc., 2007, online: 
http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,1,127,2, accessed: November 13, 2007.. 
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Fourth, China is more likely to engage on any issue, maritime or otherwise, 
bilaterally.  The process matters and is key to how the Chinese view ongoing 
relationships.  The fact that meetings are taking place (and also who attends those 
meetings) is viewed as being successful.  This could be and will be essential for any 
workable, ongoing, and positive structure that is established.  Ultimately, from the 
Chinese perspective, it is not the results that are important in the short to medium term, 
but rather the manner in which that result is sought.  The fact there is a general Chinese 
sentiment of moving forward simply from engaging in meetings, however, does not 
absolve responsibility for non-binding action on the part of the Chinese.  At some point, 
meeting just for the sake of meeting is unproductive and wasteful. 
Fifth, since treaties concerning territory are important but rarely dealt with very 
well, it will be much easier to agree upon issues devoid of territorial implications.  Since 
there are no significant Sino-American disputes over territorial claims, this should help 
facilitate ease of negotiations.  Moreover, forming agreements based on single policy 
issues seems not only possible, but is more likely than not given the history of Chinese 
agreements.  A bigger hurdle, however, has been the United States’ recent anathema 
towards international institutions and agreements that has prevented even ubiquitous 
agreements like the UNCLOS from being signed. 
Sixth, there is currently a higher chance of a non-naval incident or vessel leading 
to a conflict where the naval forces are drawn into the conflict, thus becoming a "naval 
incident."  This is different than the situation between the United States and Soviet Union 
where the concern was primarily a military-to-military, specifically navy-to-navy issue.  
Yet, even the very first annual review of the INCSEA brought non-military vessels under 
the auspices of the agreement with very little fanfare on either side.  The future of U.S.-
Chinese cooperation will be greatly influenced by the confluence of civil-military 
contact. 
Seventh, and finally, the focus of future U.S.-Chinese treaties do not need to 
contain the exact scope and limitations that led to successful engagement in other treaties 
in order to bear fruit today.   For example, some of the main reasons for the success of the 
INCSEA would be universally applicable (i.e., simply the framework itself that fostered 
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communication or annual review would be a step in the right direction).  The interaction 
is the important thing, whether it is one time or one thousand times, it is the actual 
engagement that matters. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The way ahead for the United States-PRC maritime relationship is anything but 
smooth sailing.  The events toward the end of 2007 regarding port calls and safe harbor, 
while not specifically pointing towards open conflict, nonetheless represent undercurrents 
of animosity that need to be addressed.  To deal with these facts, maritime agreements 
should be part of other, broader international institutions and maritime regimes that can 
help China’s increased interaction with the rest of the world continue peacefully.  The 
issues that need to be addressed include misunderstandings that can escalate tensions, 
territorial disputes, navigational, and specified use (fishing and mineral) rights and 
privileges.133  Additionally, “emerging regional security concerns such as piracy, 
pollution from oil spills, safety of sea lines of communication, illegal fishing, and 
exploitation of others' offshore resources” could all lead to conflict if not sufficiently 
addressed by the appropriate international institutions that govern the area.134 
The data compiled in this paper can help facilitate future United States and PRC 
maritime agreements and, more generally, cooperation.  Understanding the current nature 
of Chinese engagement can help to recalibrate our measurement standards along with our 
goals for future talks.  The mere fact that their levels of bilateral cooperation are so high 
bodes well for future agreements and institutions that will have binding provisions.  The 
key will be to find ways to bridge the gap from little victories on single policy issues to 
binding resolutions from multilateral agreements.  To foster successful cooperation 
between the United States and China (or any other international actors more generally), 
adherence to several principles will greatly increase the chances of that relationship’s 
success: building on common interests, utilization of confidence building measures 
                                                 
133 For a discussion on the importance of international legal agreements see generally: Mark J. 
Valencia. “Regional Maritime Regime Building: Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia,” Ocean 
Development & International Law, Vol 31, 2000: 229 (223-247). 
134 Ibid, 224. 
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(CBMs), basing cooperation on domestic (i.e., national) laws, building mechanisms for 
predictability, and, finally, ensuring an operating environment with both tactical and 
“political space.”  As was noted by Admiral Jacobson in an address at the Naval War 
College in Newport, any partnership between the United States and China needs to be 
“reciprocal, mutually beneficial, mutually respectful, and transparent.”135 
There is an increasing likelihood for general success of cooperation between the 
United States and the PRC.  Additionally, most of the factors that will aid in that goal are 
very achievable, “low-hanging fruit.”  Overall, the effect of each of these aspects is to 
decrease the individual cost of cooperation while, at the same time, ensuring continued 
benefits to the parties involved.  The ultimate goal should not be “to create a document, 
but to improve the relationship.”136 
                                                 
135 Remarks made by Admiral Jacobson during his opening address, December 2007 at the Naval War 
College in Newport, R.I. for the start of the conference titled, “Defining a Maritime Security Partnership 
with China.” 
136 Remarks made by Dr. David Griffiths of Dalhousie University on December 2007 at the Naval 
War College in Newport, R.I. for the start of the conference titled, “Defining a Maritime Security 
Partnership with China.” 
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March 1985 South Korea returns members of Chinese naval vessel with a supposed ‘mutiny’ 
occurring.138  Additionally, on the 23rd of March, “three Chinese navy ships, 
apparently searching for the drifting boat, intruded into South Korean waters early 
[in the day] and were driven away by warning shots.”139 
March 1988 Naval Skirmish between China and Vietnam.  “Chinese and Vietnamese ships 
exchanged gunfire”140 
1993 (4023) This dispute consists of one incident in which China placed its forces on alert in 
response to its concern that Taiwan was beginning to increase moves toward 
independence. China placed its air, naval, and land forces on alert. 
1993 (4052) As part of an anti-smuggling patrol, Chinese naval forces conducted an armed 
boarding of a Russian trawler. The seizure occurred in international waters. 
1993 (4029) China resumed exploring oil fields in waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, claimed by 
Vietnam. The Chinese search, 110 km. off Vietnam, resulted in protest from Hanoi. 
The dispute centers on contested waters near the Spratly Islands (claimed by more 
countries than just China and Vietnam). 
1994 (4030) In May 1994, China engaged in a show of force by increasing its naval presence 
around the Spratly Islands with one frigate, landing craft, torpedo boats, two 
research ships and data collection vessels. In July 1994, two Chinese warships 
blockaded a Vietnamese oilrig in the same area. China turned back at least one ship 
carrying supplies for the rig. On July 2, 1994, Vietnam seized three Chinese fishing 
boats and detained their crews. China protested Vietnam's seizure and demanded the 
return of the vessels and the crew. In August 1994, Vietnamese gunships engaged in 
a show of force by forcing a Chinese research vessel to flee an oil field claimed by 
both countries.141 
1994 (4104)  Chinese military servicemen opened fire on Russian fishermen fishing on the Agur 
                                                 
137 This list is the result of extensive searches on several databases across several fields, however, it is 
still most likely not comprehensive in nature.  Additionally, incidents not otherwise footnoted, ALL data are 
from the Version 3.10 of the Correlates of War project which still retains all copyrights on the information, 
available: Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, 
Coding Rules, and Description." Conflict Management and Peace Science 21, 2004:133-154, online: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org, accessed: February 14, 2008.. 
138 John F. Burns. “Seoul Returns Boat to China: Peking Expresses its thanks,” The New York Times, 
online: http://proquest.umi.com, accessed: September 20, 2007.  See also “Bloomberg.com, story on 
January 24th. 
139 Inquirer Wire Services. “S. Korea Fires Shots to Repel Three Chinese Naval Ships,” The 
Philadelphia Inquirer, 24 March 1985, online: http://www.philly.com, accessed: September 20, 2007. 
140 “China and Vietnam Skirmish Over Disputed Island Chain,” The New York Times, 16 March 
1988, online: 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DEED6103BF935A25750C0A96E948260, accessed: 
February 14, 2008. 
141 Michael Richardson, "China Blocks Supplies for Vietnamese Oil Rig: Face-Off in South China 
Sea," International Herald Tribune, July 19, 1994, online: 
http://www.iht.com/articles/1994/07/19/viet_0.php, accessed: March 18, 2008. 
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River on the border between Siberia and Manchuria. According to reports, a group 
of Chinese, including servicemen, gestured to the Russian fishermen to come to the 
Chinese bank of the river. As they approached, Chinese forces opened fire on the 
fishermen, searched the boat, and confiscated its nets. A Russian civilian was 
wounded. Russia protested the action.  
1994 (4065)  This dispute involves three incidents. The first two incidents involved Chinese 
military exercises that practiced landings on the Korean peninsula. The reports 
indicated that the exercises were "a show for the United States and South Korea." 
The exercises occurred on 8/23/94. The third incident occurred when China 
scrambled jets in response to the American tracking of a North Korean sub with 
sonar. 




This dispute consists of 3 incidents in which China was undertaking actions aimed 
at warning Taiwan against declaring independence. The incidents include Chinese 
sub incursions, military exercises, and an alert following an accidental Taiwanese 
shelling. 
December 1994 USS Kitty Hawk patrol, on Oct 27th sub trackers picked up a Han-class submarine.  
“S-3 planes began tracking the submarine,” U.S. Navy officials said.  The planes 
dropped listening devices to follow the vessel, but they were not armed with 
antisubmarine torpedoes.  On Oct. 28th one of the S-3s was ‘joined on’ by two 
Chinese F-6 fighter jets, which flew around them within visual range for about five 
minutes, according to a Navy official.  The next day another S-3 was ‘joined on’ by 
a single F-6, which flew in the area about 30 minutes.  U.S. Navy ships and aircraft 
operated only in international waters and airspace, and in a routine non-threatening 
manner...142 
1994 Up to 30 incidents involving vessels, Russian & other, in Chinese waters being 
detained.143 
1995 (4019) This dispute consisted of 1 incident in which a North Korean patrol boat fired at a 
Chinese fishing boat. 
1995 (4020) This dispute involved 6 incidents in which Taiwanese forces seized, boarded, and 
fired upon Chinese fishing vessels. In each case, China protested the Taiwanese 
actions.  This dispute centers on Taiwanese efforts to intimidate Chinese fishermen. 
The concurrent dispute involves Chinese efforts to intimidate Taiwan away from 
moves toward independence. 
1995 (4064)  This dispute consists of a series of incidents in which China seeks to intimidate 
Taiwan away from moves toward independence and Taiwanese and American 
responses to these Chinese actions. China deployed missiles opposite Taiwan, 
intercepted Taiwanese vessels, conducted military exercises, and conducted air and 
naval shows of force. In response, Taiwan repeatedly placed its forces on alert, 
deployed missiles, and scrambled jets. Beginning in December 1995, the US 
deployed naval forces to the area as a show of force to China. U.S. naval forces 
were sent to the region again in March 1996. 
1995 (4061) Two incidents that occurred in the same day when Chinese fighter planes 
approached the disputed Senkaku Islands and came close to violating Japanese 
airspace. Japan responded to the action by scrambling two fighters. 
                                                 
142 John F. Harris and T. Lippman. “Chinese Watched as U.S. Navy Tracked Sub,” The Washington 
Post, 15 December 1994, online: http://proquest.umi.com, accessed: September 20, 2007. 
143 Mark J. Valencia.  “Asia, the Law of the Sea and International Relations,” International Affairs 
(Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 73, No. 2, Asia and the Pacific, Apr., 1997: 263-282, 
online: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-
5850%28199704%2973%3A2%3C263%3AATLOTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B, accessed: November 7, 2007. 
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1995 (4027) In January 1995, China detained Philippine fishermen and Philippines filed an 
official protest against China. On February 22, 1995, Philippines dispatched naval 
vessels and aircraft to the Spratlys in response to the discovery of Chinese structures 
there. The naval craft closed within "half a mile" of Chinese vessels and fighter jets 
conducted renaissance flights in the area. On March 25, 1995, Philippines seized 
four Chinese fishing vessels sailing near an island claimed by Philippines. 
Philippines sentenced the new crew to 10 months in jail. China demanded the return 
of the crew and called the verdict "illegal." On May 13, 1995, China and Philippines 
engaged in mutual "show of force", in which Chinese vessels blocked a Philippine 
navy vessel sailing toward the Spratlys. Philippines sent a navy ship to the Spratly 
area and an air force jet to the area when Chinese vessels approached the Philippine 
ship. 
1996 (4062)  Chinese deployment of two submarines to the Senkaku Islands.  The deployment 
occurred following activities by ultra-nationalist groups on the islands. 
1996 (4063)  This dispute involves 2 incidents- an Indonesian naval exercise near the Natuna 
Islands and the dispatch of 5 warships to the area by China in response to the 
exercise. The Indonesian exercise was, according to reports, "intended to warn 
Beijing that Jakarta will strongly resist any Chinese attempt to assert control over a 
huge natural gas project being developed by Indonesian and US companies." China 
renounced its claims on the Natunas in 1995, but not the gas field. 
Dec ’96- 
Sep ’97 (4028) 
This dispute is based on a couple of consecutive militarized incidents between China 
and Philippines over control of the disputed Spratly Islands. In December 1996, 
Philippines upgraded its capabilities in the Spratlys to prepare for a possible conflict 
with China. Four months later, in April 1997, four armed Chinese vessels were 
spotted in the Spratly Islands and cruised near Kota and Panata Islands where 
Philippine troops are stationed. In response, Philippines scrambled fighter jets for 
patrol missions. Furthermore, they consequently deployed an additional company of 
marines (approximately 200 men). Philippine forces were also placed on alert in 
response to the sightings of Chinese warships. Philippines also deployed naval 
vessels to the disputed Scarborough Shoal and blocked the entry of three non-
governmental Chinese boats into the area in, again, April 1997. In May 1997, 
Philippines arrested 21 Chinese fishermen for poaching off the Scarborough Shoal. 
In June 1997, Philippines blasted concrete slabs and pulled up buoys in an area of 
the Spratly Islands. In the same month, Philippine navy patrolmen fired warning 
shots at a Chinese fishing vessel near Kota Island and Spratly Islands. In the next 
month, Philippines arrested at least 23 Chinese and Hong Kong fishermen because 
of "illegal entry and illegal fishing." Chinese Embassy secretary said China would 
consider official protest. On September 23, 1997, the fishermen were released. 
1998 (4328)  Vietnam sent warships and personnel to two disputed reefs in the Spratly Islands, 
setting up "permanent" facilities on the reefs. China protested the action and 
demanded that the structures be removed. Vietnam claimed that the structures were 
civilian and the personnel were not soldiers. The event, however, was triggered by 
the presence of the Vietnamese navy, not the structures. 
1998 (4329)  Philippines increased patrols in the Spratlys as a result of the sighting of unspecified 
Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. Although some officials noted the sightings were 
part of "regular movements" in the disputed archipelago, the Philippine armed 
forces ordered increased patrols in the vicinity of Pag-asa.  
1998, ’99, ‘00 
 (4128)  
This dispute is based on a series of bilateral incidents among China and Philippines, 
which occurred because of tensions about control over the disputed Spratly Islands 
by the claimant countries. In August 1998, Philippines engaged in a show of force 
by increasing patrols in the Spratly Islands as a result of the sighting of unspecified 
Chinese and Vietnamese vessels. Starting from October 28, 1998, Philippines 
protested against the intrusion of several armed Chinese vessels and cargo ships near 
a group of islands in the Spratlys.  China was reported to be constructing structures 
on the area. In response to China's naval movements in the Spratlys, Philippines 
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engaged in a counter show of force by increasing naval patrols in the area in order to 
prevent the entrance and exit of Chinese naval vessels (starting in November 1998). 
China protested the increase of Philippine patrols. On November 11, 1998, 
Philippines placed its forces on alert in the South China Sea in response to Chinese 
encroachment on one of the disputed reefs. The Philippine navy was ordered to 
"shoot across the bow" of any intruding Chinese ships. On November 29, 1998, 
Philippines arrested twenty Chinese fishermen fishing on the Spratly Islands and 
detained their boats. China protested the Philippine action. The reports state that the 
fishermen were still under detention as of December 21, 1998. On May 23, 1999, a 
Philippine navy vessel chased and collided with a Chinese fishing vessel near the 
Scarborough Shoal. The Chinese vessel sank as a result of the collision, which 
Philippines labeled as "accidental." China expressed "strong displeasure" for the 
incident. On July 19, 1999, a Philippine navy ship chased two Chinese fishing 
vessels in the Spratly Islands. The Philippine vessel fired warning shots at one of the 
fishing vessels before ramming the fishing boat. The Philippine side claimed that the 
ramming was accidental. China filed a protest in response to the Philippine show of 
force. On October 30, 1999, Vietnamese troops allegedly shot a Philippine air force 
plane flying over Pigeon Reef (a reef controlled by Vietnam). Vietnam accused 
Philippines of seriously violating Vietnam's sovereignty and reiterated its claim to 
sovereignty over all the Spratly Islands. In the first two months of 2000, Philippines 
navy boarded several Chinese fishing vessels and fired warning shots across the 
bows of two Chinese vessels near the Scarborough Shoal. The participants 
mentioned that they wanted to solve the Spratlys issue peacefully after the incidents. 
1999- ’00 (4088)  This dispute consists of 19 militarized incidents involving China, Taiwan, and the 
US. The overriding issue throughout this dispute is Chinese concern that Taiwan is 
moving toward independence from the mainland. As a result, China conducted a 
series of alerts, threats, and shows of force aimed at intimidating Taiwan. The 
Chinese shows of force included military exercises, missile tests, the deployment of 
missiles near Taiwan, and increased fighter sorties by Chinese jets near Taiwan. 
Taiwan responded to these actions by repeatedly placing its forces on alert and 
launching its own fighters when China conducted sorties near Taiwan. The tensions 
increased in late July 1999 when Chinese jets crossed the dividing line separating 
Taiwan and China on 2 separate occasions. The US responded to the increased 
tensions by deploying two aircraft carrier groups to the region in July and August 
1999. The threats and shows of force by both sides continued into 2000. In February 
2000 China passed a guided missile destroyer purchased from Russia through the 
Taiwan Strait in an effort to intimidate Taiwan. The United States responded by 
deploying the USS Kitty Hawk air craft carrier group to the region in late February.  
1999 (4180)  This dispute consists of two incidents in which Chinese naval forces conducted 
naval exercises around the disputed Senkaku Islands. In the May 1999 incident, 
Japanese patrols spotted 12 Chinese warships cruising in waters around the Senkaku 
Islands, within Japan's exclusive economic zone. In the July 1999 incident, 10 
Chinese vessels were sighted near the Senkaku Islands conducting drills. This 
dispute occurred within Japan's exclusive economic zone.  
1999 (4127)  This dispute consisted of one incident in which Japanese forces seized a South 
Korean fishing boat that was fishing in waters claimed as an exclusive economic 
zone for China and Japan. South Korea protested the seizure and Japan released the 
vessel 4 days later. 
2001 (4279)  This dispute is based on a show of force by China against Philippines. China is 
reported to have increased its naval presence in the disputed Spratly Islands in May 
2001, including conducting live fire exercises in the area. Furthermore, Chinese 
vessels were spotted in the Scarborough Shoal area for the first time. This naval 
deployment occurred even though China assured to Philippines that China was not 
seeking a military presence in the area.  
2001 (4280) This dispute involves 5 incidents between the US & China that center around 
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American reconnaissance near the Chinese coast. On 4/1/2001 an American spy 
plane crash-landed on China's Hainan Island after colliding with a Chinese fighter 
over international waters. The Chinese pilot was killed in the accidental collision. 
China, after the crash, seized both the American crew and plane. The United States 
responded to the crash and seizure by demanding release of the crew and return of 
the plane. The United States also responded by moving 3 destroyers to the waters 
off China. China scrambled 10 fighters on 4/5/01 when it detected a U.S. spy plane 
off the China coast. The dispute was resolved on 7/3/01 after the United States 
expressed regret and the plane was returned to the United States. The crew was 
released on 4/11/01.144  
2001 (4281)  This dispute consists of 6 incidents in which Chinese threats toward Taiwan 
escalated to involve shows of force by both sides. The issue under dispute involves 
Chinese concern over Taiwanese moves toward independence. Because Chinese 
actions are aimed at changing Taiwanese behavior, China is coded as the revisionist 
state. The dispute began on 3/27/01 when China threatened to declare war if Taiwan 
declared independence. On 8/1/01 China again threatened to use force if Taiwan 
declared independence. These threats were followed by a Taiwanese show of force 
in which Taiwan conducted aerial flight maneuvers with 10 AH-1W Helicopters on 
8/21/012. On 8/22/01 china conducted the largest exercises ever around Dongshan 
Island. According to reports, the exercises involved 100,000 personnel and 
simulated how the PLA would "smash" separatist actions by Taiwan. The US 
responded to the Chinese moves by threatening force if Taiwan was attacked. The 
US also conducted naval exercises in the South China Sea as a show of force. The 
naval exercise only lasted one day (8/17/01) and involved two U.S. aircraft carriers.  
2001 (4336)  This dispute consists of one incident in which a Chinese warship chased a U.S. 
Navy ship from international waters near the Chinese coast. China regards the 
waters as its own territory, but the claimed maritime boundary is not recognized 
internationally. This dispute represents another case in which Chinese forces 
challenged American surveillance activities along its coast.  
April 2001 (4278) 3 Royal Australian Navy warships in a standoff with a Chinese warship in the 
Taiwan Straits.  (Dealing with innocent passage and the rights/ responsibilities of 
warships)145  3 Australian naval vessels traversed into a "sensitive" area of the 
Taiwan Strait as they were returning from a visit to South Korea. In response, a 
Chinese warship intercepted the vessels and ordered them to leave the area. The 
Australian vessels sailed on after telling the Chinese vessel that it was within their 
right to do so. China protested the action. 
January 2004 Vietnamese fishermen killed by the Chinese navy.  “Navy ships from the PLAN 
[PRC] shot and killed nine Vietnamese fishermen and injured seven others in the 
Vinh Bac Bo (Gulf of Tonkin).  Eight fishermen were kidnapped.”146 
                                                 
144 Mark J. Valencia and Ji Guoxing, "The "North Korean" Ship and U.S. Spy Plane Incidents: 
Similarities, Differences, and Lessons Learned," Asian Survey 42, no. 5 (2002). 
145 “Australian Navy in China Standoff,” TVNZ, 30 April 2001, online: http://tvnz.co.nz, accessed: 
September 20, 2007.  Also: Barry Renfrew. “Australian Warships Rebuff Chinese,” Associated Press, 29 
April 2001, online: http://taiwansecurity.org/AP/2001/AP-042901.htm, accessed: September 20, 2007. 
146 Thi Q Lam. “Latest Gulf of Tonkin Incident Reveals China’s Imperialist Designs,” New America 
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